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I. INTRODUCTION
One of former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer’s first priori-
ties upon taking office in January 2007 was passing a sex offender
civil commitment bill.2 Enacted with bipartisan support, the law is
part of a wave of legislation restricting the freedoms of convicted
sex offenders after they have completed their sentences.3 Following
the passage of federal legislation that provided funding to states
that enact restrictive measures, every state passed such measures.4
1 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that detainees
awaiting civil commitment proceedings under California’s Sexually Violent Predator
Act must be held in conditions less harsh than those of criminal detainees).
* J.D., 2009, City University of New York School of Law. Many thanks to Professor
Ruthann Robson for her encouragement and guidance throughout the writing of this
Article. I thank Megan Stuart, Professor Rebecca Price, and Sanja Zgonjanin for their
valuable comments on earlier drafts. For their support throughout law school, I thank
Martha and Michael Kessler and, especially, Elvira Morán.
2 See Michael Cooper & Danny Hakim, Accord on Bill to Detain Sex Offenders, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at B1.
3 Danny Hakim, Bills on Workers Aid and Civil Confinement Pass, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2007, at B1; Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act, N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
art. 10 (McKinney 2008).
4 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Regis-
tration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006) (requiring sex offenders to register for at least
10 years after prison, parole or probation, and states to collect identifying information
283
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These measures include registration and community-notification
requirements, as well as residency restrictions.5 At the extreme end
of this troubling continuum are state laws that allow offenders who
complete their sentences to be committed civilly. Twenty states
have passed such sex offender civil commitment laws.6
Rather than protecting communities, such measures may be
counterproductive, isolating sex offenders from community sup-
port and hindering their reintegration and motivation to change.7
Forty-five convicted sex offenders live in one Long Island town—
seventeen on one block—in Suffolk County, where sex offenders
are prohibited from living within a quarter mile of any school, play-
ground, or day care center, regardless of whether their crimes in-
volved children.8  In Miami, thirty-two sex offenders live under a
bridge, an arrangement approved by the Corrections Department
in the absence of affordable housing that complies with the
about offenders, including their name, address, photograph, and offense history).
This Act was amended by “Megan’s Law” in 1996, which created a notification provi-
sion allowing states to disclose information collected through registration. Pub. L. No.
104-145 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e). A later amendment, the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, expanded regis-
tration and notification requirements, to include license plate numbers, physical de-
scriptions, and the name and address of any school attended. The Act further
required jurisdictions to make registry information publicly available, and created re-
gistration and notification requirements depending on the “tier” of offender, ranging
from fifteen years to lifelong. The constitutionality of a federal sex offender civil com-
mitment statute has been called into question. The Fourth Circuit held that the stat-
ute is beyond the scope of Congress’ authority and intrudes upon the powers of the
states. United States v. Comstock, 1 F.3d 274, 276 2009), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 2828
(U.S. Jun. 22, 2009) (No. 08-1224) (argued Jan. 12, 2010). HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO
EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDERS LAWS IN THE U.S. (2007) (describing sex offender regis-
tration and community notification laws in the United States and their effects on
parolees), http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/HumanRightsWatchReportNoEasyAnswers.pdf.
5 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4.
6 TRACY VELASQUEZ VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PURSUIT OF SAFETY: SEX OFFENDER
POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (2008), available at http://www.vera.org/download
?file=1801/Sex_offender_policy_with_appendices_final.pdf. Louisiana is the latest
state to consider civilly committing sex offenders. Governor Bobby Jindal introduced
legislation in January 2008 providing for the civil commitment of sex offenders after
they complete their sentencesJindal had been critical of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in 2008 overturning laws in six states, including Louisiana, allowing defendants
convicted of child rape to be sentenced to death. Michelle Millhollon, Jindal Works on
Sex Offenders’ Civil Confinement, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Dec. 4, 2008, at A1; see Ken-
nedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641 (2008).
7 ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE
RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 70 (2006) (citing Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence Analysis of Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Laws, in PROTECTING
SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE AND THERAPY (2003)).
8 Jennifer Gonnerman, The House Where They Live, N.Y. MAG., Dec. 30, 2008.
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county’s residency restrictions.9 A sex offender in Michigan froze
to death on the street; shelters were forced to turn him away be-
cause they were located within one thousand feet of a school.10 A
computer technician in Washington State, convicted of soliciting
an underage prostitute, and whose profile was posted on the state’s
online sex offender registry, was fired from four jobs and could not
find an apartment.11 A developmentally disabled, wheelchair-
bound man, previously convicted of charges related to exposing
himself to a child, called the sheriff’s office reporting that he
wanted to kill himself.12 He made the call after fliers were posted in
his neighborhood identifying him and his conviction.13 He was
found dead the next day, apparently due to suicide.14 These anec-
dotes describe the effects of restrictive measures on convicted sex
offenders living in the community; the stigma and isolation are
even more extreme for those who are civilly committed.
Civil commitment laws often are enacted after a highly publi-
cized violent crime by a sex offender,15 and a rush by elected offi-
cials to show they are “doing something.”16  Based on the popular
and erroneous belief that sex offenders are highly recidivistic,17 sex
9 Nicolas Spangler, For Sexual Predators, It’s a Camp of Isolation, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
19, 2008, at A1.
10 Death Sentence: Sex-Offender Law Pushed Homeless Man Out of Shelters, Into Cold,
GRAND RAPID PRESS, Jan. 29, 2009, at A1.
11 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 83.




15 Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at A1.
16 JANUS, supra note 7, at 13–16 (describing a pattern of passages of sex offender
commitment laws following highly publicized rape-murders by recently released sex
offenders in Washington, Minnesota and New Jersey). New York followed a similar
pattern.  Although Connie Russo Carrierro’s murder by a convicted sex offender was
not as widely publicized across the state, it drew a great deal of media attention in
Westchester. The man who killed her had been ejected from a homeless shelter, re-
sulting in a monitoring system for sex offenders and calls by the Westchester County
Executive, Andrew Spano, for a civil commitment law. Anahad O’Connor, Westchester
Plans Monitoring of Sex Offenders in Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at B6.
17 See Michelle Cohen & Elizabeth L. Jeglic, Sex Offender Legislation in the United
States: What Do We Know?, 51 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 369,
369 (2007) (noting that research suggests that sex offenders’ rates of recidivism are
low relative to other criminal offenders); see also N.Y. STATE DIV. OF PROB. AND CORR.
ALTERNATIVES, RESEARCH BULLETIN: SEX OFFENDER POPULATIONS, RECIDIVISM AND AC-
TUARIAL ASSESSMENT 3,  (1997) (summarizing the research on re-arrest rates: “sex of-
fenders are arrested and/or convicted of committing a new sex crime at a lower rate
than other offenders who commit other new non-sexual crimes”); JANUS, supra note 7,
at 91–92 (arguing that sex offender laws undo feminist work on understandings of
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offender civil commitment laws are bad public policy.18  States that
have passed them now face heavy burdens, with burgeoning num-
bers of civilly committed sex offenders and a dearth of community
placements after release19 (though in some states few offenders are
ever released).20 Despite their popularity, the effectiveness of civil
commitment laws is unproven.21  What has been clearly docu-
mented, however, is that they are enormously expensive.22 The
even greater expense is to American constitutional principles.
Preventive detention raises obvious concerns about infringe-
ments on the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws
and on double jeopardy.23 But even constitutional infringements
stemming from civil commitment that do not involve bodily re-
straint, such as limitations on First Amendment rights, are more
than merely incidental: they reveal the practical implications of
civil commitment’s disregard for individuals’ constitutional rights.
violence; focusing public attention on “predator violence” at expense of addressing
the more common sources as well as the underlying causes of violence).
18 JANUS, supra note 7, at 61–66 (reviewing the benefits and costs of civil commit-
ment laws).
19 See, e.g. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ARTICLE 10: SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT
AND TREATMENT ACT OF 2007 27 (2009) (noting that the annual cost of civil confine-
ment per civil committee is $225,000, and that such costs will pose a challenge to the
state as the numbers of sex offenders in civil confinement increases); see also, e.g.,
Candace Rondeaux, Va. Faces Ballooning Cost to Confine Sex Offenders, WASH. POST, Apr.
2, 2006, at C01; Davey & Goodnough, supra note 15 (describing the struggles of Kan-
sas to keep up with the costs of the program there; costs have risen from $1.2 million
to nearly $6.9 million annually, and a state audit found that unless offenders are re-
leased from the program, costs will continue to rise).
20 VELÁSQUEZ, supra note 6, at 27.
21 Cohen & Jeglic, supra note 17, at 380. “[T]he current legal methodologies for
controlling sex offenders are unproven and very much underresearched . . . . The
public is relying upon sex-offender-related legislation to protect them from sex of-
fenders, but the research on these methods has not been promising thus far.” Id.
22 While estimates of costs vary, there is general agreement that expenditures are
high and rising.  Davey & Goodnough, supra note 15 (noting that costs are spiraling,
with state expenditures on civil commitment approaching $450 million annually.
Civil commitment costs approximately $100,000 per year per person, compared to
$26,000 per year for prisoners); JANUS, supra note 7, at 62–63 (stating that the average
cost of civil commitment per sex offender is $75,000 annually; the total costs nation-
ally are estimated at two hundred twenty-five to three hundred thirty-one million dol-
lars annually); see VELÁSQUEZ, supra note 6, at 26 (estimating the cost in New York per
sex offender at $225,000 annually).
23 See, e.g., JANUS, supra note 7, at 93–95 (arguing that civil commitment represents
an ominous trend favoring suspension of constitutional rights in the name of prevent-
ing risks to public safety such as crime and terrorism); Steven I. Friedland, On Treat-
ment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 73,
121–22 (1999) (arguing that allowing civil commitment of sex offenders opens the
door to the involuntary detention of all recidivists).
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Courts and commentators have long viewed First Amendment
protections as first among the individual rights protected by the
Bill of Rights, a foundation underlying other protections.24 The Su-
preme Court has noted that the protections of the First Amend-
ment have a “preferred place” in the American constitutional
scheme, and, therefore, “any attempt to restrict those liberties must
be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or
remotely, but by clear and present danger.”25 The Court has strug-
gled to reconcile these basic protections of individual rights with
perceived threats to public safety and the national interest.26
This Article will argue that the Court has veered in a danger-
ous direction in its civil commitment jurisprudence, as demon-
strated by judicial treatment of civilly committed sex offenders’
First Amendment claims.  This approach exemplifies the jurispru-
dence of fear Justice Brandeis famously warned against: “Fear of
serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. . . . It is the function of speech to free men from the
bondage of irrational fears.”27 Part II of this Article places civil
commitment in the context of the historical and ongoing practice
of involuntarily confining people with mental illnesses. Part II also
discusses the especial importance of judicial review given the politi-
cal environment that has spawned sex offender civil commitment
laws.  Part III describes the Kansas v. Hendricks decision upholding
sex offender civil commitment, in which the Court found that be-
cause Kansas’s civil commitment law was not punitive, it did not
violate the prohibitions on double jeopardy and ex post facto laws.
Part IV reviews the standards applied by courts to First Amendment
claims brought by prisoners, focusing on the standard set out in
Turner v. Safley. Part V describes federal courts’ treatment of civilly
committed sex offenders’ free speech and free exercise of religion
24 Edmond Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464, 471 (1956)
(arguing that Justice Black’s view, as articulated in his decision in Marsh v. Alabama,
that the First Amendment has a “preferred position” among the constitutional rights
is supported by the historical views of the founders).
25 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945) (holding that a state law requiring
labor organizers to secure permission and register before soliciting members violates
the First Amendment); see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (citing Schnei-
der v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 151 (1939) (stating that “exercise of [First Amend-
ment] rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men”)).
26 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (upholding a state law that
outlawed advocating the overthrow of the government); c.f. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that inflammatory speech can only be pun-
ished if it incites imminent lawless action).
27 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, J.J.,
concurring).
288 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:283
claims, and argues that the courts’ reliance on prison standards
undermines the premise of the Kansas v. Hendricks decision. Part
VI questions the underpinnings of Hendricks and suggests that
courts should not rely on prison First Amendment cases to decide
the First Amendment rights of civilly committed sex offenders.
This Part suggests that courts look above the floor, as embodied by
prison standards, but also consider First Amendment rights of indi-
viduals in other contexts, to develop a standard for the First
Amendment rights of civilly committed sex offenders.
II. CIVIL COMMITMENT IN CONTEXT
Civil commitment is the term used to describe involuntary hos-
pitalization of people with mental illnesses.28 While individuals
have been civilly confined in America since colonial times, the stat-
utory structure for committing persons to insane asylums devel-
oped in the 1800s.29 A series of Supreme Court decisions
established that proving dangerousness30 was a prerequisite to in-
voluntary commitment, the standard of proof in commitment pro-
ceedings was clear and convincing evidence,31 and that mental
illness was required in addition to dangerousness.32
Modeled on the early civil commitment laws, “sexually violent
predator” civil commitment laws more closely resemble the sexual
psychopath laws of the 1930s and 1940s.33 Most states either re-
28 See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL
2 (2005).
29 Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Mental Health Law: Its History and Its Future, 20 MENTAL
& PHYS. DISABILITY L. REP. 599, 599 (1996).
30 O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). “A finding of ‘mental illness’
alone cannot justify a State’s locking up a person against his will . . . . Assuming that
that term can be given a reasonably precise content and that the ‘mentally ill’ can be
identified with reasonable accuracy, there still is no constitutional basis for confining
such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live in freedom.”
Id. at 575.  Michael Perlin notes that O’Connor is particularly important for its recogni-
tion of “the legitimacy of judicial involvement in activities previously considered to be
the exclusive domain of psychiatrists.” MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 142 (1998).
31 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (noting that “civil commitment
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due pro-
cess protection”).
32 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
33 Franklin T. Wilson, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: An Analysis of Kansas v. Crane and
the Fine Line Between Civil and Criminal Sanctions, 84 PRISON J. 379, 380 (2004); see JA-
NUS, supra note 7, at 22; see also Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S.
270 (1940) (upholding a Minnesota statute providing for the civil commitment of sex
offenders who habitually committed sexual misconduct, utterly lacked control of their
sexual impulses, and were likely to commit future harm).
2009] RIGHTS OF CIVILLY COMMITTED SEX OFFENDERS 289
pealed or stopped using the psychopath laws after the Supreme
Court ruled that sex offenders could not be civilly committed until
they had been found guilty of prior criminal acts, thereby ensuring
procedural protections.34 Unlike modern sex offender civil com-
mitment laws, under sexual psychopath laws, civil commitment was
an alternative to a criminal trial imprisonment.
By contrast, contemporary sex offender civil commitment laws
provide for commitment after imprisonment. The civil commit-
ment of sex offenders has required a new set of laws because sex
offenders generally do not meet the definition of mental illness in
the statutory requirements for civilly committing people with
mental illnesses, though critics have charged that even “mental ill-
ness” is an ill-defined term.35
Sex offenders are a “discrete, insular minority”36 whose consti-
tutional rights are subject to infringement by a democratic major-
ity’s impulse to keep them “behind bars.”37  If judicial review is
essential to protect the rights of convicted felons, convicted sex of-
fenders who have completed their sentences equally require such
protection. It has been argued that the Supreme Court’s extreme
deference to prison administrators denies prisoners constitutional
protections “where judicial review is most essential.”38 The same
brand of deference removes protection from a population that is
even more unpopular than the general class of prisoners, those
34 Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504
(1972).  For further discussion, see PERLIN, supra note 30, at section 2A-3.3.
35 PERLIN, supra note 30, at 62–68. “[I]nvoluntary civil commitment statutes pre-
sent a bewildering array of broad, narrow[,] and even circular definitions of mental
illness for the purposes of the involuntary civil commitment process.” Id. at 66–67.
Perlin comments that the “mental abnormality” standard upheld in Kansas v. Hen-
dricks “will most likely blur even further the line between clinical and legal terminol-
ogy in the commitment context.” Id. at 68.
36 See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
37 For an example of the majority’s impulse, see Friedland, supra note 23, at 76
(quoting Maria Holiday, the victim of a sexual offense, “I don’t really care if they’re in
a state mental hospital or if they’re in jail for the rest of their life. I just want them
behind bars.  I don’t want them out,” 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Jan. 11,
1998)).
38 JANUS, supra note 7, at 118–19 (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in
Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 441, 442 (1999) (arguing that
authoritarian institutions share several characteristics: they are not operated demo-
cratically; they involve people who are generally involuntarily present; and they are
rigidly hierarchical; noting also that the Supreme Court defers to the institutions’
authority and refuses to protect individual liberties)); see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 101–03 (1980) (arguing that judicial
review protects political minorities, who are systematically disadvantaged in a repre-
sentative democracy).
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who have been deemed “sexually violent predators”39 subject to
civil commitment. If prisoners generally are a despised minority,40
sex offenders are the most despised.41 But where judicial review is
most needed, the courts have adopted an extremely deferential ap-
proach, giving civil commitment center administrators wide berth
to curtail sex offenders’ constitutional rights.
The glaring constitutional problem with civil commitment is
that it violates the basic protections in the criminal justice system
by moving sex offenders to the civil arena where protections are
more limited.42 The Supreme Court has not recognized this consti-
tutional infirmity. In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court held that civil
commitment is not punitive and therefore does not violate the
Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses.43 If this decision seems
counterintuitive in light of elected officials’ and the public’s desire
to lock up sex offenders beyond their prison terms,44 recent court
decisions make it clear that the Supreme Court’s position is an out-
lier view, even in the federal judiciary. The Court’s five–four deci-
39 “Sexually violent predator” is the term used in many of the civil commitment
statutes. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a22 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 71.09.01–.903 (2003). This Article uses the term “civilly committed sex offenders”
because other descriptions are unwieldy (e.g. “people who have been convicted of sex
offenses and are civilly committed”). But this shorthand is problematic: referring to
people as “sex offenders” reduces individuals to their crimes. Even the definition of
“sex offender” is far from uniform. See Adam Shajnfeld & Richard B. Krueger, Re-
forming (Purportedly) Non-Punitive Responses to Sexual Offending, 25 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH
L. 81, 82 (2006) (describing the varying definitions of “sex offender” in different
states, which include persons convicted of statutory rape in New York, possession of
child pornography in Florida, engaging in consensual incest in Louisiana, and inde-
cent exposure in Texas).
40 JANUS, supra note 7, at n.207 (quoting CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 289 (1993) (“Incarcerated criminal offenders constitute a
despised minority without the political power to influence the policies of legislative
and executive officials.”).
41 Michael Perlin argues that sex offenders have replaced insanity defendants as
“the lightening rod for our fears, our hatreds, and our punitive urges.” Michael L.
Perlin, “There’s No Success Like Failure/And Failure’s No Success at All”: Exposing the Pretex-
tuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (1998). “If we are no
longer focusing on insanity defendants as the most ‘despised’ group in society, it is
more likely because there is a new universe of ‘monsters’ replacing them in our de-
monology: sex offenders, known variously, as mentally disordered sex offenders, or
sexually violent predators, the ultimate ‘other.’ ” Id.
42 JANUS, supra note 7, at 32–34. Character evidence is routinely admitted in civil
commitment proceedings, and the evidence concerns hypothetical future acts, rather
than specific past allegations. Id. The privilege against self-incrimination does not ap-
ply in civil commitment proceedings. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374 (1986). The
burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence
rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
43 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
44 See supra notes 16 and 38 and accompanying text.
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sion in Hendricks has been called into question by subsequent lower
federal court decisions reviewing the First Amendment claims of
civilly committed sex offenders. Lower courts most often apply
prison standards to review the constitutional claims of sex offend-
ers, rarely recognizing any distinction between criminal imprison-
ment and civil commitment.
III. KANSAS V. HENDRICKS: UPHOLDING SEX OFFENDER
CIVIL COMMITMENT
In 1997 the Supreme Court upheld Kansas’s civil commitment
statute against a challenge by the first person committed under its
provisions, Leroy Hendricks.45 The Court’s decision hinged on its
finding the statute’s provisions were not punitive, as they impli-
cated neither retribution nor deterrence, “the two primary objec-
tives of criminal punishment.”46
The challenged statute provided for the civil commitment of
persons who are likely to commit “predatory acts of sexual vio-
lence” due to a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder”47
and required specific procedures for inmates already confined to
prison, including a jury trial, a right to counsel and cross examine
witnesses, and annual review by the committing court.48 Hendricks,
a convicted sex offender scheduled for release from prison soon
after the statute was enacted, challenged his commitment on sub-
stantive due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto grounds.49
Hendricks appealed the Kansas trial court’s civil commitment
order, and the Kansas Supreme Court found that the Act violated
his substantive due process rights.50 Under the statute, involuntary
civil commitment required a finding by clear and convincing evi-
dence that a person is both mentally ill and a danger to him- or
herself or others, but the Act’s definition of mental abnormality
did not satisfy the mental illness requirement.51 The majority did
not reach Hendricks’s ex post facto or double jeopardy claims.52
The Supreme Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court deci-
sion.  The Court cited the history of forcible civil detainment of
people posing a danger to public health and safety, concluding
45 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
46 Id. at 361–62.
47 Id. at 350 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a22 (1994)).
48 Id. at 352–53.
49 Id. at 350.
50 In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (1996).
51 Id. at 138.
52 Id.
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that involuntary commitment statutes are not contrary to “our un-
derstanding of ordered liberty” so long as they include appropriate
procedural protections and evidentiary standards.53 The Court dis-
agreed with the Kansas Supreme Court’s holding that the require-
ment of mental defect or personality disorder was constitutionally
defective, finding that mental illness is “devoid of talismanic signifi-
cance” and therefore is not the only mental impairment that can
pass constitutional muster.54 The Court found that Hendricks satis-
fied the statutory requirement of lacking volitional control based
on a diagnosis of pedophilia and Hendricks’s admission that he
was unable to control his urge to molest children.55
Relying on the Kennedy v. Mendoza–Martinez factors for deter-
mining whether a law is penal or regulatory in nature,56 the Court
found that the Kansas civil commitment statute was not punitive. In
applying the factors,57 the Court noted the absence of several char-
acteristics of criminal laws. The Act’s use of prior criminal conduct
was solely for evidentiary purposes: to show mental abnormality or
future dangerousness.58 That neither a criminal conviction nor a
finding of scienter was required indicated that the statute was not
retributive.59 The Court rejected Hendricks’s claim that the lack of
treatment given him showed that confinement is “disguised pun-
ishment,” and it noted that incapacitation was a legitimate goal
53 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
54 Id. at 358–59.
55 Id. at 360.
56 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (holding that a statute divesting an American citi-
zen of citizenship for leaving the country to evade military service at a time of war was
unconstitutional). The Hendricks decision holds that scienter is an element, but Ken-
nedy lists it among seven factors. See generally id.
57 The factors are described as follows: “Whether the sanction involves an affirma-
tive disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment, retribution[,] and deterrence, whether
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears exces-
sive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and
may often point in differing directions. Absent conclusive evidence of congressional
intent as to the penal nature of a statute, these factors must be considered in relation
to the statute on its face.” Id. at 168–69.
58 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362.  The Court did not address the prejudicial effect of
such evidence.  Juries and judges aside, even clinicians’ professional judgment can be
biased by “vivid or emotionally laden information.” Robert A. Prentky et al., Sexually
Violent Predators in the Courtroom: Science on Trial, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357,
371–72 (2006) [hereinafter Prentky, Science on Trial] (citing Rebecca L. Jackson et al.,
The Adequacy and Accuracy of Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations: Contextualized Risk As-
sessment in Clinical Practice, 3 INT’L J. OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 115 (2004)).
59 Prentky, Science on Trial, supra note 59.
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given the finding of the state supreme court that treatment was
unavailable and Hendricks might be untreatable.60 Even though
the Kansas Supreme Court found that treatment was not the pri-
mary goal, it could still be an ancillary goal.61 Regardless, the court
decided the Act was not punitive.62 The Court noted that the States
have wide latitude in developing treatment regimens.63
The Court based its findings on several assertions by the state:
(1) the intent of civil commitment was not punitive, a small seg-
ment of “particularly dangerous” persons were confined; (2) treat-
ment was recommended if possible; and (3) the statute permitted
immediate release when the person no longer met the statutory
criteria.64 The Court then concluded that because the Act was not
punitive or criminal, Hendricks did not have sufficient basis for
double jeopardy or ex post facto claims.65
Justice Breyer’s dissent found an ex post facto clause prohibition
on the Act, as it inflicted a greater punishment on Hendricks than
the law ascribed to his crimes.66 Justice Breyer reasoned that while
an incapacitative law’s lack of concern for treatment is not suffi-
cient to make the law punitive, the State’s assertion that treatment
exists, and its delay of treatment until after the completion of a
criminal sentence suggests a punitive purpose.67 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court of Kansas had found that segregation was the pri-
mary purpose of the statute, with treatment “incidental at best.”68
The Supreme Court of the United States normally defers to state
court interpretations of its own laws, and the record supported the
Kansas court’s conclusion.69 Justice Breyer observed that Hendricks
received no treatment for the first ten months of his civil commit-
60 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363, 365.
61 Id. at 367.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 368 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982)). The quality of
treatment in sex offender commitment facilities is uneven at best, and professional
standards are lacking. In one facility in Florida, only one of hundreds of detainees was
deemed ready for release while the underfunded facility was administered by a private
contractor. Abby Goodnough & Monica Davey, A Record of Failure at Center for Sex Of-
fenders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007. “Many outside experts, even some of the center’s
critics, said the state’s insufficient financing of the center made Florida as much to
blame as Liberty for the many failings, many of which are common in other states.” Id.
64 Prentky, Science on Trial, supra note 59, at 368–69.
65 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369.
66 Id. at 379.
67 Id. at 381. By providing for treatment only years after an offense is committed,
when the offender is nearing the completion of his or her sentence, the statute neces-
sitates “further incapacitation” and therefore “begins to look punitive.” Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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ment and, at the time of the civil commitment determination, the
State had allocated no funding for treatment and had hired no one
to operate the program or to serve as clinical director or psychia-
trist.70  He further noted that incapacitation is a punitive goal.71
Incapacitation appeared to be the primary purpose of the statute
as treatment was delayed until after the prison sentence was com-
pleted, and there was no provision for considering less restrictive
alternatives (unlike in the civil commitment of persons with mental
illness).72 The state’s assertion that civil commitment was not puni-
tive was wholly unconvincing.73 In a subsequent case, the Court
clarified that while there need not be a complete lack of control,
“there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior,”
in addition to proof of dangerousness and mental abnormality, to
satisfy the requirements of civil commitment.74
Hendricks has been criticized on a number of grounds, for:
“strain[ing] the distinction between criminal punishment and civil
commitment”;75 creating criteria based on erroneous understand-
ings of sex offending behavior;76 relying on an “unacceptably
fuzzy” mental abnormality standard;77 ignoring the clear legislative
purpose of the statute;78 and, more fundamentally, authorizing
70 Prentky, Science on Trial, supra note 59, at 383–84.
71 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 379–80 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*11–12 (incapacitation is one important purpose of criminal punishment) and
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965) (“Punishment serves several pur-
poses; retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent—and preventive. One of the reasons soci-
ety imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm,
but that does not make imprisonment any the less punishment.”)).
72 Id. at 389.
73 Id.
74 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 407 (2002).
75 WINICK, supra note 28, at 120.
76 Id. at 128 (citing studies that show that sex offenders can control their
behavior).
77 See Friedland, supra note 23, at 115, 117 (arguing that states have wide latitude
to allow for the civil commitment of people with mental abnormalities and personality
disorders, “giving rise to the specter of political agendas and capriciousness in the
law’s application.”).
78 JANUS, supra note 7, at 40. “[T]he Court approved the use of predator commit-
ments in the face of clear evidence that their central purpose was to bypass the limits
of the criminal law.” Id. The legislative findings in the statute clearly evinced the legis-
lature’s view that sex offenders are not amenable to treatment: “[S]exually violent
predators generally have antisocial personality features which are unamenable to ex-
isting mental illness treatment modalities.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994). Kansas
Attorney General Robert Stephan testified to the state legislature that prior to the
passage of the civil commitment law, “there [was] no adequate legal provision to con-
tinue incarceration of violent sexual predators past the period of mandatory incarcer-
ation.” Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 23, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (No. 95-1649). Ste-
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“the use of extensive preventive detention, dressed up in mental
health language.”79 Scholars also note that predicting dangerous-
ness on the basis of past crimes “would be ‘impermissible character
evidence’ for other felony defendants.”80 The core constitutional
problems of Hendricks are only amplified by the application of the
prison standard to the constitutional claims of individuals with civil
status.
IV. TURNER V. SAFLEY: EXTREME DEFERENCE
TO PRISON ADMINISTRATORS
Federal courts routinely apply an extremely deferential prison
standard to the First Amendment claims of civilly committed sex
offenders. Turner v. Safley established this extreme judicial defer-
ence to prison administrators for prisoners’ First Amendment
rights,81 cementing the decade-long shift away from the high-level
scrutiny courts had applied to infringements on prisoners’ consti-
tutional rights. Courts’ approaches to prisoners’ constitutional
rights have been embodied in three phases in modern times. Fed-
eral courts adhered to the “hands-off” doctrine starting in the
1930s, refusing to protect prisoners from constitutional violations,
partly on the basis of federalism.82 Starting in the late 1960s, fed-
eral courts extended constitutional protections to many aspects of
incarceration, including First Amendment rights and living condi-
tions.83 During this more protective period, under Procunier v. Mar-
tinez, the standard for First Amendment violations of prisoner
rights was akin to strict scrutiny: the regulation had to further “an
important or substantial government interest unrelated to the sup-
pression of expression” and the limitation could be “no greater
than necessary” to the interest involved.84 This protective period
phan also testified that the Act “will keep dangerous sex offenders confined past their
scheduled prison sentence.” Id. Carla Stovall, Attorney General of Kansas and mem-
ber of the state Parole Board at the time Hendricks was decided by the Supreme Court,
testified, “We cannot open our prison doors and let these animals back into our com-
munities.” Id. She described the goal of the Act as keeping sex offenders “locked up
indefinitely.” Id.
79 Perlin, supra note 42, at 1275.
80 Erica Beecher–Monas & Edgar Garcia–Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerous-
ness: Is There a Blueprint for Violence?, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 307 (2006).
81 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
82 James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the “Turnerization” of Prisoners’ Rights,
10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 97, 99 (2006).
83 Id. at 100.
84 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (striking down a prison regula-
tion barring correspondence from inmates to non-inmates that was inflammatory or
complained excessively).
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was short-lived. The seeds of judicial deference to prison adminis-
trators were sown in Pell v. Procunier, which noted that decisions
regarding prisoner security “are peculiarly within the province and
professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence
of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials
have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such
matters.”85
A 1977 case involving prisoners’ rights to engage in activities
related to union formation, including the use of bulk mailings, fur-
thered the doctrinal shift: the Court criticized the lower court’s
failure to give “appropriate deference to the decisions of prison
administrators and appropriate recognition to the peculiar and re-
strictive circumstances of penal confinement.”86 Two years later,
the Court upheld a restriction prohibiting pretrial detainees from
receiving hardcover books from sources other than publishers or
bookstores.87
The Turner decision announced a new era of extreme defer-
ence, citing the prior cases trending toward deference, noting that
the Court applied heightened scrutiny to none of them, and re-
jecting the Eighth Circuit’s use of Martinez’s strict scrutiny standard
over the deferential review of the later cases.88
In Turner, prisoners challenged Mississippi Division of Correc-
tions regulations restricting prisoner mail and marriage.89 The
marriage regulation prohibited inmates from marrying other in-
mates or non-inmates, unless the prison administration found com-
pelling reasons to allow it.90 The challenged mail regulations
prohibited mail between inmates at different prisons, unless the
inmates were immediate family members, corresponding about le-
gal matters, or the prison administration had deemed such corre-
spondence in the best interest of the parties.91 At the facility in
85 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (upholding a prison regulation prohibiting face-to-
face media interviews with prisoners).
86 Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125, 129 (1977) (hold-
ing that restrictions on prisoners’ union meetings and solicitation were rationally re-
lated to prison administrators’ objectives).
87 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550 (1979).
88 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 86–87, 88 (1987) (rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s
bases for distinguishing the deferential cases where the Eighth Circuit distinguished
the cases as involving time, place, and manner restrictions or “presumptively danger-
ous inmate activities”).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 97–98.
91 Id. at 81–82.
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which the plaintiffs were imprisoned, the rule in practice barred all
inmates from writing incarcerated non-family members.92 Inmates
challenged the mail regulations as an infringement of their First
Amendment rights under the free speech clause.93
The Court held that the marriage regulation was not reasona-
bly related to the asserted penological interests of promoting the
rehabilitation of women through self-reliance or protecting secur-
ity by preventing love triangles, but upheld the prison mail regula-
tions, setting out an extremely deferential test: “when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regula-
tion is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate interests.”94 A
four-factor test determines the reasonableness of the regulation.
First,“there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the
prison regulation and the legitimate [and neutral] governmental
interest put forward to justify it.”95 The second factor is “whether
there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain
open to prison inmates” and the third factor is the “impact accom-
modation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards
and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources gen-
erally.”96  The Court explained that when “accommodation of the
asserted right will have a significant ‘ripple effect’ on fellow in-
mates or on prison staff, courts should be particularly deferential
to the informed discretion of corrections officials.”97  The last fac-
tor is “the absence of ready alternatives” to the challenged regula-
tion.  If  “obvious, easy alternatives” exist “at de minimis cost to valid
penological interests,” the regulation may not be reasonable.98 The
Court specified that this factor does not require that prison offi-
cials find the least restrictive alternative.99
In applying the test, the Court found that the mail rule was
reasonably related to “legitimate security interests,” noting that it
was content-neutral, and not an exaggerated response to legitimate
safety and security concerns.100 The Court compared mail between
prisoners to parole conditioned on non-association with known
criminals, reasoning that mail between prisoners “is a potential
92 Id. at 82.
93 Id. at 93; U.S. CONST. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .” Id.
94 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.




99 Id. at 90–91.
100 Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.
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spur to criminal behavior.”  The prohibition therefore furthered
the state’s policy of separating gang members.101 As to the second
factor, the court reasoned that alternative means of communica-
tion remain open because prisoners are able to correspond with
non-prisoners.102 Such a broad interpretation of alternative means
weighs strongly in favor of an infringement’s constitutionality. The
Court’s analysis of the third factor, in which it criticized the Eighth
Circuit’s decision, exhibits its new brand of super-deference: the
Court noted that prison officials asserted that mail between in-
mates contributes to informal organizations that threaten safety
and security, but mentions no evidence that supports the asser-
tion.103 As to the fourth factor, the plaintiffs proposed that inmate
correspondence be monitored, rather than banned, but the Court
found that this could not be achieved at de minimis cost, citing
prison administrators’ assertion that it would be impossible to read
all correspondence, and that prisoners could still communicate in
code.104
Justice Steven’s opinion, concurring as to the marriage regula-
tion and dissenting as to the mail regulation, criticized the majority
for accepting prison administrators’ rationale, and ignoring the
lower courts’ finding that the justification for the rules was specula-
tive. No facts were presented to support assertions that the rules
furthered safety and security interests.105 He noted that requiring
no more than a “logical connection” between the challenged regu-
lation and a legitimate penological goal provides almost no consti-
tutional protection; “the use of bullwhips on prisoners” for the
purpose of discipline could satisfy the logical connection require-
ment.106 Justice Stevens criticized the majority’s inconsistent ap-
proach, giving “virtually total deference” to prison administrators
on the mail policy while discounting prison administration specula-
tion about security risks related to marriage.107 This inconsistent
stance was contrary to the text of the Constitution, which  “more
clearly protects the right to communicate than the right to
marry.”108
Commentators have echoed Stevens’ criticisms, noting that
101 Id. at 91–92.
102 Id. at 92.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 93.
105 Id. at 106.
106 Turner, 482 U.S. at 101.
107 Id. at 113.
108 Id. at 116.
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the first factor of the Turner test is determinative, as the factors
operate “like dominoes: Once the first and most weighty prong
falls, the others do as well.”109 Furthermore, that first critical prong
fails to differentiate between weak and strong rights.110 Professor
James E. Robertson has described Turner as “faux balancing” be-
cause while the decision appears to require the weighing of factors,
the prisoner’s infringed-upon right is entirely absent from the anal-
ysis.111 Courts do not examine the degree of deprivation or impor-
tance of the right at issue, and therefore most any accommodation
can be found onerous.
Subsequent cases followed Turner’s extreme deference to
prison administrators on prison mail, rather than the skepticism
the Court had afforded the justifications for the marriage ban. An-
other five-to-four decision exemplified the new approach, this time
applying the Turner test to a First Amendment free exercise of re-
ligion claim.112 In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, the Court upheld work
rules in a New Jersey prison that assigned prisoners to work details
outside the prison, thereby preventing Muslim prisoners from at-
tending a weekly service at the prison.113 The Court found that the
rules were logically connected to the legitimate purpose of main-
taining “institutional order and security” as well as relieving over-
crowding during the day.114 The requirement of a full eight-hour
workday was logically related to rehabilitation goals.115 The deci-
sion afforded little importance to the second factor, interpreting
alternative means broadly: after conceding that prisoners had no
alternative means of exercising their right to attend the weekly ser-
vice,116 the Court concluded that because the service takes place at
a specific time, as commanded by the Koran—every Friday after
the sun reaches its zenith but before the afternoon prayer117—it
was “extraordinarily difficult” for prison officials to accommo-
date.118 The Court noted that in Turner, the analysis of this factor
109 Robertson, supra note 82, at 120.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 119 (citing Jordan v. Gardener, 986 F.2d 1521, 1597 (9th Cir. 1993) (Wal-
lace, C.J., dissenting)).
112 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); see U.S. CONST. amend. I.
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . . . .” Id.
113 O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 353.
114 Id. at 351–52.
115 Id. at 352.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 345.
118 Id. at 351.
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focused on whether prisoners were denied “all means of expres-
sion,” rather than the means to communicate with other prisoners,
and reasoned that prisoners were not denied all forms of religious
exercise, only the ability to participate in the weekly service.119 As
to the impact on other inmates, prison personnel and the alloca-
tion of prison resources, the Court found that the alternatives sug-
gested by the prisoners, allowing Muslim prisoners to work on-site
or on weekends, would either undermine the goal of off-site work,
require additional resources, promote the growth of affinity
groups, which would threaten security, or create perceptions of fa-
voritism.120 The Court thus conflated the last two factors, coming
to the conclusion that “there are no ‘obvious, easy alternatives to
the policy adopted by petitioners.’”121
Outside of the context of prison rights cases, free exercise and
free speech claims are analyzed under entirely distinct doctrinal
lines.122 Under the Turner test, it seems that all constitutional rights
are equivalent in the eyes of the Court (with the exception, per-
haps, of marriage).  Accordingly, the criticisms of the test’s applica-
tion to free exercise and free speech claims are remarkably similar.
Like Justice Stevens’s dissent in Turner, Justice Blackmun’s dissent
in O’Lone points out that the Court accepted the prison administra-
tion’s implausible reasons for rejecting alternative policies with no
substantiation.123 The prison arranged work schedules to accom-
modate Jewish and Christian inmates’ attendance at their weekly
services, but prison administrators asserted that such accommoda-
tion could not be made for Muslims and failed to explain why re-
sulting Jewish- and Christian- affinity groups did not pose a security
threat, while Muslims did.124 This illustrates the problem of Turner
extreme deference: while the Turner Court voiced concern for re-
specting the “policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner com-
plaints” and “the need to protect constitutional rights,”125 a
119 O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 352.
120 Id. at 352–53.
121 Id. at 353 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987)).
122 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (holding that religious
duty was not a defense to a criminal indictment); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause is incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and thereby applies to the states); see also
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding a conviction for espionage
for publishing leaflets challenging the draft because such activity posed a clear and
present danger); see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding a
criminal prohibition against burning draft cards).
123 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 365 (1987).
124 Id. at 365–66.
125 Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 396 (1974)).
2009] RIGHTS OF CIVILLY COMMITTED SEX OFFENDERS 301
deference that requires no substantiation of the legitimate interests
asserted by prison officials, is more than deference: it is practically
a foregone conclusion.126
Subsequent cases applied the Turner rule to other First
Amendment claims by prisoners.  Two years later, the Court up-
held regulations allowing wardens to prohibit inmate’s receipt of
subscription publications if prison administrators found the spe-
cific publications detrimental to institutional security.127  The
Court also upheld policies that infringed on inmates’ rights of asso-
ciation in the form of restrictive visitation policies, adding a new
requirement to the Turner test: the burden is on the prisoner to
disprove the validity of the challenged regulation, rather than on
the administration to prove its validity.128 An even harsher restric-
tion on the receipt of publications was upheld by the Roberts
Court, allowing prison administrators to forbid inmates in the
highest security unit from receiving any newspapers, magazines, or
photographs.129  In Beard v. Banks, the Court granted summary
judgment to prison officials after assessing just one of three as-
serted purposes of the restriction.  After finding that “motivat[ing]
better behavior on the part of particularly difficult prisoners” was  a
legitimate penological interest reasonably related to the chal-
lenged restriction, the Court felt no need to examine the other
asserted rationales.130  The Court noted that sufficient evidence
was presented to show that the restrictions serve to advance that
purpose: “namely, the views of the deputy superintendent.”131  The
decision illustrates the importance of the first factor in determin-
ing the outcome of the Turner test.  In analyzing the third factor,
Justice Breyer reasoned that “[i]f the Policy (in the authorities’
view) helps to produce better behavior, then its absence (in the
authorities’ view) will help to produce worse behavior, e.g., “back-
sliding.”132  Prison administrators’ assertion that a policy is effective
in furthering a legitimate penological purpose, is the beginning
and end of the analysis; the rest of the factors are superfluous.
Professor James E. Robertson has noted that the Turner test
126 O’Lone exemplifies the manner in which the Turner test is applied, though a
federal statute has since established strict scrutiny for prisoners’ free-exercise claims.
See O’Lone, 482 U.S. 342. This statute has also been applied to civilly committed sex
offender claims. See infra Part IV.B.
127 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 403 (1989).
128 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S.126, 132 (2003).
129 Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 535 (2006).
130 Id. at 530.
131 Id. at 531.
132 Id.
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has been applied by lower federal courts far beyond its initial First
Amendment application, to such constitutional rights as equal pro-
tection.133 He argues that Turner exemplifies the Rehnquist Court’s
judicial minimalism, an approach that “accommodates and implic-
itly legitimates the countermajoritarian difficulty,” skirting key
questions, such as which constitutional rights are consistent with
incarceration.134 If it is troubling that all manner of prisoners’ con-
stitutional rights are being “Turnerized,” the entry of “Turneriza-
tion” into the civil arena, through its application to the
constitutional claims of civilly committed sex offenders, is even
more alarming.
V. CIVIL STATUS IS CIVIL STATUS (EXCEPT WHEN IT’S NOT):
THE COURTS’ TREATMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS
BY CIVILLY COMMITTED SEX OFFENDERS
The application of the Turner prison standard by federal
courts to civilly committed sex offenders’ First Amendment claims
shows that the courts see little distinction between imprisonment
and civil commitment.  The Supreme Court is isolated in its view,
articulated in Hendricks, that civil commitment is not imprison-
ment.135 An examination of First Amendment cases illustrates how
the conflation of prison and civil commitment operates.
Two of the most common First Amendment claims brought by
civilly committed sex offenders are free speech clause challenges to
mail policies in civil commitment facilities, and free exercise clause
challenges to infringements on civil committees’ religious prac-
tices.  In both categories of claims, federal courts frequently rely on
prison precedents, and fail to acknowledge any difference in the
status of civilly committed sex offenders, as compared to the status
of prisoners.136
133 Robertson, supra note 82, at 105. The Supreme Court applied the Turner stan-
dard “beyond its original First Amendment boundaries” in Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 244 (1991), where the Court upheld the involuntary use of psychotropic
medication on prison inmates in a due process claim, and lower courts have contin-
ued in that vein. Robertson, supra note 80, at 105. Roberts calls this expansion of the
Turner approach to non-First Amendment constitutional rights “Turnerization.” Id.
134 Id. at 118.
135 See supra notes 44–65 and accompanying text.
136 Civilly committed sex offenders have also brought First Amendment claims
based on retaliation for complaints or lawsuits.  In these cases, courts also rely on the
prison standard, but because prisoners’ rights in this arena are clearly established, in
this instance, courts need go no further than establishing the “floor.” One particularly
well-reasoned decision (although later reversed in a memorandum disposition and
remanded to the circuit court of appeals) is in Hydrick v. Hunter, a class-action suit
filed by California sex offenders who are civilly committed or detained awaiting com-
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A. Free Speech Claims
In analyzing civilly committed sex offenders’ challenges to
mail policies, the courts often go no further than prison mail cases
to conclude that either there is no First Amendment right, or no
clearly established right for the purposes of overcoming a qualified
immunity defense.  The courts in these cases could just as easily be
reviewing claims from prisoners.  If civil commitment is not prison,
the prison standard should establish the floor, but not the very ar-
chitecture of the building.
Rivera v. Rogers137 exemplifies the judicial approach that treats
civilly committed sex offenders’ First Amendment claims no differ-
ently than those of prison inmates.  In Rivera, the Third Circuit
considered a First Amendment claim by a civilly committed New
Jersey sex offender, and started from the premise that “his status is
similar to that of a prisoner . . . .”138 The court affirmed the district
court’s decision granting the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment, referencing the district court’s application of the Turner
test.139 The district court relied heavily on Waterman, a Third Cir-
cuit decision, quoting its pronouncement that “it is beyond dispute
that New Jersey has a legitimate penological interest in rehabilitat-
mitment hearings. 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S.Ct. 2431 (2009) (mem.).
The offenders sued the state and administrators of Atascadero State Hospital, claim-
ing, among other things, that retaliation for filing lawsuits and coerced participation
in treatment constituted violations of their First Amendment rights. Id. at 984. The
Ninth Circuit noted that in ascertaining whether a right is clearly established for qual-
ified immunity purposes, there are two relevant bodies of case law: rights afforded
prisoners, which set the floor, and rights afforded other civilly detained persons, such
as involuntarily hospitalized people with mental illnesses. Id. at 989. The court cited
Youngberg’s finding that civilly detained persons are entitled to “more considerate
treatment and conditions of confinement” than inmates. Id. at 989 (citing Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982)). After finding that protection from retaliation is
a clearly established right for prisoners, the court noted that the involuntary hospitali-
zation in Youngberg may not be entirely analogous to the civil commitment of sex
offenders since “SVPs have been civilly committed subsequent to criminal convictions
and have been adjudged to pose a danger to the health and safety of others,” and so
“the rights of SVPs may not necessarily be coextensive with those of all other civilly
detained persons.” Id. at 990.  The court did not decide what the standard should be,
because the issue was whether qualified immunity had been satisfied. It remains to be
seen how the case will be decided on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court since the
case was reversed without a written opinion.
137 Rivera v. Rogers, 224 F. App’x 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2007).
138 If his status was different in any respect, the court did not say so. Id.
139 Id. at 151 (citing Rivera v. Rogers, No. 02-CV-2798 (DMC), 2006 WL 1455789
(D.N.J. May 22, 2006)). The defendants presumably are personnel and administrators
from the Special Treatment Unit that housed Rivera, although the decisions do not
say so specifically.
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ing its most dangerous and compulsive sex offenders.”140 The dis-
trict court had neglected to mention that Waterman involved the
claims of incarcerated sex offenders still serving their prison
terms,141 unlike the plaintiff in Rivera, who had completed his sen-
tence and was civilly committed.142
The district court also cited Youngberg v. Romeo, the Supreme
Court case that established that involuntarily committed persons
with mental illnesses are entitled to more considerate treatment
and conditions than criminals, because, unlike criminals, their con-
finement is not punitive.143 In Youngberg, the mother of a mentally
retarded man who was involuntarily committed to Pennhurst State
Hospital in Pennsylvania filed suit against hospital officials. Her
son had suffered injuries more than seventy times, some of them
self-inflicted and some inflicted by other patients. Some of the inju-
ries, which included a broken arm, human bites, and black eyes,
had become infected due to inadequate medical care and contact
with human excrement.144 Hospital staff kept him shackled to a
bed or chair for long periods of time.145 The suit claimed violation
of his liberty interests in safe conditions of confinement, freedom
from bodily restraint, and skills training.146 The Court reasoned
that because prisoners have a right to personal security, the invol-
untarily committed must as well: “[i]f it is cruel and unusual pun-
ishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must
be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily confined—who
may not be punished at all—in unsafe conditions.”147 However, the
claim of a right to the training and development of needed skills
(termed “habilitation”) did not succeed. The Court found that the
State has the discretion to decide which services are appropriate.148
Decisions regarding treatment “if made by a professional” are “pre-
sumptively valid.”149
In Rivera, the district court noted that patients’ constitutional
rights “must be balanced against the reasons put forth by the State
for restricting their liberties,” then turned to Turner, strangely char-
140 Rivera, 2006 WL 1455789, at *2 (citing Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 215
(3d Cir. 1999)).
141 Waterman, 183 F.3d at 210.
142 Rivera, 2006 WL 1455789, at *1.
143 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982).
144 Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1980).
145 Id.
146 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315.
147 Id. at 315–16.
148 Id. at 318.
149 Id. at 323.
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acterizing it as an expansion of Youngberg.150 Youngberg and Turner
are worth comparing: both involve constitutional claims by institu-
tionalized persons. In both, the U.S. Supreme Court set out rules
affording considerable deference to institutional administrators.151
In setting out standards of review, both cases emphasize the impor-
tance of considering the purpose of the confinement.152 Youngberg
did not involve a First Amendment claim but a substantive due pro-
cess claim based on liberty interests.153 The levels of deference the
two cases establish are different, if only by degrees. The deference
to state hospital administrators in Youngberg, while strong, is not as
complete as the deference to prison administrators in Turner.154 In
establishing a standard of review, Justice Powell’s decision in
Youngberg cites the standard articulated by the Third Circuit in Ri-
vera: “the Constitution only requires that the courts make certain
that professional judgment was in fact exercised.”155 The Court
later qualifies this somewhat: while a decision made by a profes-
sional is presumptively valid, the decision may create liability if the
professional’s decision is “such a substantial departure from ac-
cepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demon-
strate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision
on such a judgment.”156 The Court notes that while “[p]ersons who
150 Rivera, No. 02-CV-2798 (DMC), 2006 WL 1455789, at *2 (D.N.J. May 22, 2006).
“The Supreme Court expanded on the Youngberg decision in Turner v. Safley.” Id.
151 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82–83 (1987).
152 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321 (finding that the purpose of the plaintiff’s confine-
ment was to provide “reasonable care and safety” where his family was not able to
provide it for him); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 93 (holding that a regulation that
impinges on a prisoner’s constitutional rights is valid “if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests”).
153 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.  The challenge to the marriage restriction in Turner
also was a substantive due process challenge.
154 This is not to suggest that Youngberg offers a model of judicial protection of
constitutional rights. Youngberg has been strongly criticized for establishing a pre-
sumption of validity of professional decisions and eliminating the least restrictive
means doctrine of care for people with mental disabilities. See, e.g., Bruce A. Arrigo,
The Logic of Identity and the Politics of Justice: Establishing a Right to Community-Based Treat-
ment for the Institutionalized Mentally Disabled, 18 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINE-
MENT 1, 2–4 (1992).
155 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321 (citing Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d
Cir. 1980)). Youngberg defines a professional decisionmaker as “a person competent,
whether by education, training[,] or experience, to make the particular decision at
issue. Long-term treatment decisions normally should be made by persons with de-
grees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training in areas such as psychol-
ogy, physical therapy, or the care and training of the retarded. Of course, day-to-day
decisions regarding care . . . necessarily will be made in many instances by employees
without formal training but who are subject to the supervision of qualified persons.”
Id. at 323 n.30.
156 Id. at 323.
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have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more consider-
ate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose
conditions of confinement are designed to punish,” the standard is
“lower than the ‘compelling’ or ‘substantial’ necessity tests” ap-
plied by the Third Circuit.157
Thus Youngberg establishes a standard that is very deferential to
hospital administrators, but unlike Turner, presumably involves
some examination of decisionmakers’ qualifications and whether
their decisions substantially depart from acceptable practices. Even
while noting that courts should defer to professional judgment, the
Youngberg Court opined that, given the facts of the plaintiff’s case,
“[i]t may well be unreasonable not to provide training when train-
ing could significantly reduce the need for restraints or the likeli-
hood of violence.”158 In Turner, by contrast, the Court does not
concern itself with the qualifications of prison administrators or
the possibility of a substantial departure from accepted profes-
sional judgment. The decision draws on Bell v. Wolfish, which held
that the “expert judgment” of prison administrators should be ac-
corded “wide-ranging deference.”159 Wolfish has been criticized for
ignoring the factual question of “whether [prison officials] actually
possess such expertise.”160
The Third Circuit in Rivera invokes Youngberg in a token ac-
knowledgment of the plaintiff’s civil status, but proceeds to use the
prison standard articulated by Turner as the framework for its analy-
sis.  The court’s reliance on the district court’s reasoning is troub-
ling given the lower court’s failure to differentiate between the
status of prisoners and involuntarily committed persons and its
seemingly reflexive decision to rely on prison standards.161 The dis-
157 Id. at 321–22.
158 Id. at 324.
159 441 U.S. 520, 547–48 (1979) (upholding a number of challenged prison poli-
cies, including double-bunking in rooms intended for single occupancy, restricting
the receipt of hardcover books and food packages, and requiring visual body-cavity
searches after visits).
160 Robertson, supra note 82, at 102 (citing Fred Cohen, The Limits of Judicial Reform
of Prisons: What Works, What Doesn’t, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 421, 440–41 (2004) (quoting
John Boston of the Legal Aid Society Prisoners Rights Project as saying, “If the poet
laureate of New York were named a prison warden on January 1, he would be a cor-
rections expert in the Bell [v. Wolfish] mode the following morning.”)). Id. at 125
n.49.
161 Rivera v. Rogers, 224 F. App’x 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2007). “[W]e agree with the
District Court’s decision to proceed with its analysis of his First Amendment claim by
looking to case law interpreting a prisoner’s rights. The [d]istrict [c]ourt’s Memoran-
dum Opinion contains a thorough application of the test set forth in Turner[,] and we
see no reason to reiterate that entire analysis here.” Id. (citation omitted).
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trict court refers to civilly committed sex offenders variously as “pa-
tients,” “residents,” and “prisoners,”162 sometimes switching terms
in the same sentence: “Prisoners may still receive and send mail to
whomever they wish, so long as a resident is not receiving contra-
band, pornographic material or sexually explicit correspon-
dence.”163 The court is consistent in referring to “penological
interests” throughout.164 The Third Circuit echoes the district
court’s approach, noting that although “prisoners and those invol-
untarily committed, by virtue of their incarceration and custody
status, ‘do not forfeit their First Amendment right to use of the
mails,’165 that right can be limited by . . . legitimate penological
interests.”166 If the plaintiff’s constitutional rights can be infringed
upon to further penological interests,167 it follows that the court
views his status as that of a prisoner incarcerated in a penological
institution.168
In applying the Turner test to Rivera’s claim that his First
Amendment rights were violated by the facility’s policy of opening
packages (with the exception of legal mail) mailed to prisoners,169
the district court found that the facility’s legitimate interests in
safety and rehabilitation were furthered by the mail policy. Those
interests and the policy were rationally related because harmful
materials in the mail posed a threat to staff and patients and be-
cause sexually explicit material “could prove detrimental to a pa-
tient’s rehabilitation.”170 Interestingly, the court cited Youngberg in
analyzing the second factor of the Turner test, finding that persons
committed to the units have alternative means of receiving and
sending mail, so long as mail received did not include “contra-
band, pornographic material or sexually explicit correspon-
162 Rivera v. Rogers, No. 02-CV-2798 (DMC), 2006 WL 1455789, at *3 (D.N.J. May
22, 2006).
163 Id. at *3 (emphases added).
164 Id. at *3, *4.
165 Rivera, 224 F. App’x at 151 (quoting Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir.
2006) (holding that a state prison’s policy of opening mail outside of prisoners’ pres-
ence was not reasonably related to its legitimate interest in protecting the safety and
security of the prison in the wake of post-September 11 anthrax scares when the pol-
icy was still being followed three years later)).
166 Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 92 (1987)).
167 “Penology” is defined as “[t]he study of penal institutions, crime prevention,
and the punishment and rehabilitation of criminals, including the art of fitting the
right treatment to an offender.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 954 (8th ed. 2005).
168 The district court cited two other prisoner cases to support its decision: Fraise v.
Terhune, 283 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2002) and DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47 (3d Cir.
2000).
169 Rivera, 2006 WL 1455789, at *3.
170 Id.
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dence,”171 while noting Youngberg’s holding that the constitutional
rights of patients at state institutions “may be restricted in certain
situations after being balanced against the reasons put forth by the
State for restricting their liberties.”172 Invoking Youngberg here did
not change the analysis, however, because the Turner test was the
overriding framework; once the first factor was satisfied, the rest
fell into place “like dominoes.”173 Unlike in Youngberg, the court
gave only cursory consideration to how the challenged policies ad-
vanced state interests; there is no indication of how the court came
to its conclusion that a sexually explicit letter from the plaintiff’s
girlfriend was detrimental to his therapy. The court’s ultimate
holding that the policy was rationally related to legitimate inter-
ests174 thus comes as no surprise.
Even a court that views civil commitment as different from im-
prisonment will apply the prison standard, raising the question of
what civil status means.  In Fogle v. Bellow–Smith, the clinical leader
of a sex offender treatment center entered a “read order” for the
plaintiff’s mail after staff members discovered that he had received
a phone card from his father with a number preprogrammed for a
sex line, in violation of the center’s policy against unauthorized
exchanges and gifts.175 The district court stated that civil commit-
ment can be distinguished from imprisonment, but nevertheless
applied Turner.176 For the purposes of qualified immunity, the
court found that the plaintiff did not have an established First
Amendment right to receive mail without interference.177
The court began by establishing that the plaintiff’s confiden-
tial communications with his attorney are clearly protected, noting
that prisoners’ legal mail is protected, and “the standard would not
be lower for civil detainees, who are generally subject to a higher
level of protection [than prisoners].”178 As to whether the plaintiff
has a right to non-legal correspondence free from scrutiny, and
whether the delay in receipt of mail caused by the read order was a
constitutional violation, the court relied on the Turner standard, as
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Robertson, supra note 80, at 120; see id. and accompanying text.
174 Rivera, 2006 WL 1455789, at *3.
175 No. 4:06CV00227-ERW, 2007 WL 2507756, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 30, 2007). The
plaintiff’s father also sent a similar phone card to another offender at the center in
violation of the same policy. See id.
176 Id. at *7, *8.
177 Id. at *8.
178 Id. at *7.
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articulated by a decision in an Eighth Circuit prisoner case.179 The
court found that the Turner analysis was “applicable in the context
of a civil detainee,” noting that “in determining the legitimacy of
the state interest, the classification of the Plaintiff is significant.”180
The court in Fogle then used Youngberg “to assess the legitimate gov-
ernment interest,” reasoning that the court’s role is to determine
whether the restraint was the “result of professional judgment.”181
The court deferred to the judgment of the Center’s personnel,
quickly concluding, “the Court believes that the treatment objec-
tives of MSOTC are comparable to the safety concerns of pris-
ons.”182 The decision gives no indication that the court examined
the qualifications of the decisionmakers or whether their decision
was a substantial departure from practices in similar facilities. So,
while the decision nods to Youngberg, the extreme deference em-
bodied by Turner decided the case, as the court accepted without
question the administrators’ asserted justifications. The court ac-
cepted the commitment-center administrators’ argument that
reading the mail was a necessary response to the plaintiff’s alleged
breaking of phone card rules. Finding that the center “stated a le-
gitimate government interest in reviewing Plaintiff’s non-legal
mail, to ensure that Plaintiff did not continue to violate the rules
regarding phone cards,”183 the court did not explain how reading
the content of mail related to two rules infractions—use of a
phone card to call a sex line and an unauthorized gift or exchange
of a phone card to another offender—that appear unrelated to the
written content of correspondence.184 The extreme deference of
Turner requires no such explanation, and thus infringements on
free speech are easy to defend.
A third decision involving mail restrictions takes a more con-
sidered approach to determining the standard for a civilly commit-
ted sex offender’s First Amendment claims.  The court’s
conclusion that Turner applies is deceptive because its application
179 Id. (citing Thongvanh v. Thalacker, 17 F.3d 256, 259 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
that a ban on non-English prisoner correspondence violated due process, free speech
and equal protection, where exceptions were made for Spanish speakers as well as for
the plaintiff’s correspondence with his Lao-speaking parents and grandparents, for
which translation services were used)).
180 Id. at *8.
181 Fogle, 2007 WL 2507756 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322(1982)).
182 Id. “The Court is not in a position to second guess the professional judgment of
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of Turner eschews the usual extreme deference; this perhaps is an
acknowledgement that the status of civil committees is distinct
from that of prisoners and deserves a lesser degree of deference. In
Willis v. Smith,185 the district court found that staff at a civil commit-
ment facility had violated the rights of a sex offender by opening a
publication mailed to him when he was not present and confiscat-
ing it without ever informing him of their actions. The plaintiff’s
friend had mailed him a book that advocated the abolition of po-
lygraphy, and the facility staff had confiscated it without informing
him of its delivery because they believed that its contents were anti-
therapeutic (the facility used polygraph tests extensively as part of
its treatment).186 Interestingly, the plaintiff argued that his status
was much like a prisoner, and that he should therefore enjoy the
protections he had enjoyed when he was in prison, including
prompt notification and a clear process for appeal if the prison
administration deemed incoming mail to be contraband.187 The
defendants argued that whether he is considered a patient or pris-
oner, the constitutional analysis would be the same, and the court
agreed. Indeed, after considering the statuses of pretrial detainees
and persons confined to state mental institutions after being found
not guilty by reason of insanity, the court concluded that the status
of civilly committed sex offenders was substantially similar to that
of prisoners because, like prisoners, they have been convicted of a
crime.188 For this reason, the prisoner precedents applied. The
court found that the plaintiff may be subjected to even more re-
strictive policies than prisoners, in light of the facility’s interest in
maintaining not only security, but also “the integrity of the treat-
ment environment.”189
However, after concluding that the plaintiff’s rights may be
even more limited than prisoners’, the court disagreed with the
facility’s professional judgments, even while proclaiming its defer-
ence to institutional decisionmaking. The court held that facility
administrators failed to assert a legitimate institutional interest for
opening the plaintiff’s mail outside of his presence.190 This exami-
nation of the institutional interest is more searching than the usual
application of Turner. While the defendants asserted that they
opened the package outside of the plaintiff’s presence because of
185 No. C04-4012-MWB, 2005 WL 550528 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 28, 2005).
186 Id. at *3–4.
187 Id. at *8.
188 Id. at *10.
189 Id. at *12.
190 Id. at *16.
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the high volume of packages during the holidays, unlike in Turner,
the court did not view administrative efficiency as a factor in its
analysis. As to the facility’s decision to deny the plaintiff access to
the entire book, the court found that only some parts of the book
could be constitutionally withheld from the plaintiff, and that the
defendant’s efforts to deny information from specific sources was
based on “personal biases and prejudices rather than upon their
professional judgment.”191 While the court deferred to the admin-
istrators’ professional judgment that portions of the book on poly-
graph counter measures were anti-therapeutic, noting that the
plaintiff presented no contrary evidence at trial, the court disputed
administrators’ assertions that materials on the validity of polygra-
phy would cause other patients at the facility to refuse to take poly-
graph tests.192 In doing so, the court disregarded Turner’s “ripple
effect” factor.  Since the impact on other patients would, in the
court’s view, be minimal, the infringement on the plaintiff’s consti-
tutional rights by denying him the sections of the book questioning
polygraphy was not justified.193
While this decision presents a possibility of a searching inquiry
with regard to civilly committed sex offenders’ First Amendment
claims, quite unlike the Turner standard’s usual extreme deference
toward prison administrators, it has been cited by at least one other
federal district court to support a finding that civilly committed sex
offenders are like prisoners and that Turner applies to civilly com-
mitted sex offenders’ claims regarding mail policies.194 The latter
decision fails to note that Willis’s version of Turner looks like an
altogether different standard, as it uncharacteristically eschews ex-
treme deference.195
191 Willis, 2005 WL 550528  at *18.
192 Id. at *18.
193 Id.
194 See Kollyns v. Watson, No. 3:05-2401-JFA-JRM, 2006 WL 2716426 (D.S.C. Sept.
22, 2006) (holding that the Turner test applies to sexually violent predators and find-
ing that the plaintiff failed to show that the facility’s policy impinged on his right to
freely exercise his Wiccan religion). Kollyns also cites the application of the Turner test
by a district court in Iowa in Thompson v. Vilsack, and by a district court in New Jersey
in Rivera v. Rogers, to civilly committed sex offenders’ claims without acknowledging
that the applications of Turner differ so dramatically in those two decisions that they
scarcely seem to be using the same standard. Kollyns, 2006 WL 2716426, at *3 (citing
Thompson v. Vilsack, 328 F. Supp. 2d 974 (S.D. Iowa 2004) and Rivera v. Rogers, No.
02-CV-2798 (DMC), 2006 WL 1455789 (D.N.J. May 22, 2006)). For further discussion
of Rivera and Thompson, see supra notes 137–74 and infra notes 220–30 and related
text.
195 Two recent mail cases brought by civilly committed sex offenders mention an
array of rules. Both decisions hold that the plaintiffs stated cognizable claims regard-
ing the seizing and opening of incoming and outgoing mail, without indicating which
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Compared to the court decisions on free speech, the free exer-
cise of religion decisions are generally less tolerant of First Amend-
ment infringements.  The standards courts apply still approximate
those applied to prisoners’ claims.  The difference is that while in-
fringements on civilly committed sex offenders’ free speech rights
are permissible under the Turner standard, courts are more protec-
tive of the free exercise of religion for prisoners and civilly commit-
ted sex offenders alike.
B. Free Exercise of Religion Claims
Decisions on civilly committed sex offenders’ free exercise of
religion claims likewise echo courts’ reasoning in decisions on pris-
oners’ free exercise of religion claims, but with these claims, plain-
tiffs are much more likely to prevail, much like prisoner–plaintiffs.
The courts rely on two standards: the Turner test and a federal stat-
ute that incorporates and expands the First Amendment protec-
tions of free exercise of religion for institutionalized persons.  Both
tests are also used for prisoners’ free exercise of religion claims.
With the passage of the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act196 (RLUIPA), the landscape for prisoners’ free ex-
ercise claims has shifted considerably from the precedent set by
O’Lone.197 RLUIPA was passed by Congress after its predecessor,
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),198 was invalidated
as applied to the states.199  The Supreme Court held that the RFRA
exceeded Congress’s remedial powers under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.200 RLUIPA thus far has withstood constitu-
tional challenges: its scope is narrower than RFRA, applying only to
land use and institutionalized persons. The provisions of the stat-
ute relating to the free exercise of religion by institutionalized per-
sons were enacted under Congress’ interstate commerce and
standard should be applied. See McNeal v. Mayberg, No. 1:07-cv-00851-GSA (PC), 2008
WL 5114650 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2008); see also Allen v. Mayberg, No. 1:06-cv-01801-AWI-
GSA (PC), 2008 WL 5135629 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2008).
196 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2006). After citing the Turner test for incoming
prisoner mail and the Procunier v. Martinez standard for censorship of outgoing mail,
these cases cite Hydrick for the proposition that plaintiffs’ rights must be balanced
with the State’s interest in safety and security. The court does not clarify how the
Turner, Procunier, and Hydrick standards relate to one another.
197 See supra notes 113–26 and related discussion.
198 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4.
199 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
200 Id.
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spending powers.201 The statute prohibits the imposition of “sub-
stantial burdens” on the religious practices of people confined to
institutions unless the government can prove that the burden fur-
thers a compelling government interest by the least restrictive
means.202 RLUIPA therefore “incorporates and exceeds the Consti-
tution’s basic protections of religious exercise,” expressly referenc-
ing the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and
establishing the strict scrutiny standard of review for claims under
the statute.203
At least three federal courts have assumed without discussion
that RLUIPA applies to civilly committed sex offenders,204 but it is
worth examining whether the statute applies to them and, if so,
under what category they are included because these questions im-
plicate fundamental questions about sex offender civil commit-
ment. RLUIPA applies to state-run institutions in four categories:
(1) facilities for persons who are mentally ill, mentally retarded, or
disabled; (2) “a jail, prison[,] or other correctional facility”;  (3) “a
pretrial detention facility”; or (4) a facility for juveniles in some
circumstances.205 RLUIPA might apply to civilly committed sex of-
fenders under the first or second definition but both possibilities
raise constitutional difficulties. As to the application of RLUIPA to
persons who are mentally ill, state statutes providing for civil com-
mitment of sex offenders have used several variations of mental
abnormality to justify civil commitment, as well as to determine cri-
teria for commitment. Courts have struggled with the definition of
mental impairment, as opposed to mental illness, as it pertains to
the civil commitment of sex offenders and persons with mental ill-
ness, respectively. Critics argue that the definitions used for sex of-
fenders are so blurry that serious constitutional questions are
implicated.206 Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act, for example,
201 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b). The land-use provisions also rely on Congress’s
powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
202 Id.
203 Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 198 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2).
204 Thompson v. Vilsack, 328 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (S.D. Iowa 2004); Bilal v. Leh-
man, No. C04-2507-JLR-JPD, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93152 (D. Wash. Oct. 2, 2006);
DeSimone v. Bartow, No. 08-C-638, 2008 WL 3540565 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 12, 2008). See
infra notes 220–55 and related discussion.
205 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(1)(B). The statute defines an institution as a state-owned, -
operated, or -managed facility “for persons who are mentally ill, disabled, or retarded,
or chronically ill or handicapped,” or “a jail, prison, or other correctional facility”
which “provid[es] skilled nursing, intermediate or long-term care, or custodial or resi-
dential care.” Id. § 1997(1).
206 For further discussion of the Court’s treatment of mental-health issues with re-
gard to civil commitment, see Rudolph Alexander, Jr., The United States Supreme Court
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defines a sexually violent predator as “any person who has been
convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which
makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual
violence.”207 In Hendricks, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme
Court’s holding that the statutory requirement of “mental abnor-
mality” failed to satisfy due process requirements that civilly com-
mitted individuals have a serious mental illness.208 The decision
allows states great latitude in how mental impairment is defined.209
While the American Psychiatric Association has protested the “un-
acceptable misuse of psychiatry” to civilly commit sex offenders,
“serv[ing] essentially nonmedical purposes,”210 states remain free
to commit sex offenders based on diagnoses which arguably apply
to large numbers of incarcerated people, whether or not they have
been convicted of sex offenses.211 Whether courts would view
RLUIPA as applying to civilly committed sex offenders depends on
their interpretation of the statute’s term “mental illness.” If their
interpretation is broad enough to encompass “mental impair-
ment,” civilly committed sex offenders likely are covered by
RLUIPA.
RLUIPA might apply to sex offenders under RLUIPA’s “cor-
rectional facility” category.  The statute does not define “correc-
tional facility.” In defining “correctional institution,” Black’s Law
Dictionary says “[s]ee prison,” and it further defines “[c]orrection”
as “[t]he punishment and treatment of a criminal offender
through a program of imprisonment, parole, and probation.”212
Under Hendricks, sex offender civil commitment would appear not
to fall into RLUIPA’s correctional facility category because correc-
tional facilities are at least partially punitive.213 But because courts
and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 84 PRISON JOURNAL 361 (2004); see also Frank-
lin T. Wilson, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: An Analysis of Kansas v. Crane and the Fine Line
Between Civil and Criminal Sanctions, 84 PRISON J. 379 (2004); see also JANUS, supra note
7, at 36–41; see also Adam J. Falk, Sex Offenders, Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility:
The Constitutional Boundaries of Civil Commitment After Kansas v. Hendricks, 25 AM. J. L.
& MED. 117 (1999).
207 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a03(a) (1999), 59-29a07 (2006), 59-29a08 (2007).
208 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370 (1997).
209 In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 137–38 (Kan. 1994); Hen-
dricks, 521 U.S. at 359.
210 JANUS, supra note 7, at 23 (2006) (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DANGEROUS
SEX OFFENDERS: A TASK FORCE REPORT ON SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS 173–74
(1999)).
211 Friedland, supra note 23, at 121–22.
212 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 293, 294 (8th ed. 2005).
213 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369.
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considering RLUIPA claims brought by civilly committed sex of-
fenders have also relied on prison free exercise cases and on Tur-
ner, without questioning the prison standard’s applicability, an
argument can be made that sex offender civil commitment does
belong in RLUIPA’s correctional facility category. RLUIPA’s defini-
tion of institutionalized persons includes persons in “other correc-
tional facilit[ies]”;214 it might also be argued that civil commitment
centers, being post-correctional facilities, are included in this
category.
RLUIPA’s protections ought to extend to civilly committed sex
offenders because, while Congress may not have anticipated sex
offender civil commitment when it set out statutory categories of
institutions, civilly committed sex offenders are, in fact, institution-
alized. In a case upholding RLUIPA against an Establishment
Clause challenge, the Supreme Court described the institutions
covered by the statute as those:
in which the government exerts a degree of control unparal-
leled in civilian society and severely disabling to private religious
exercise. RLUIPA thus protects institutionalized persons who
are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are
therefore dependent on the government’s permission and ac-
commodation for exercise of their religion.215
By this description, sex offenders who have been confined civilly,
and whose physical movement, food, physical possessions, and at-
tendance at religious services are subject to the control of commit-
ment facility administrators, are institutionalized persons.
In analyzing the Free Exercise Clause claims of civilly commit-
ted sex offenders, two district courts applied an unusually deferen-
tial version of the Turner prison standard, and another never
reached the First Amendment issue because it held that the chal-
lenged practices violated RLUIPA. In all three decisions, the analy-
ses employed are identical to prison free exercise of religion
cases.216
Thompson v. Vilsack217 is a rare decision finding a challenged
restriction unconstitutional under the Turner standard. The district
214 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
215 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 710 (2005) (citation omitted).
216 Two other recent district court decisions also treated a civilly committed sex
offender’s free exercise claim in the same manner as a prisoner’s claim, applying both
RLUIPA and Turner and granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
under both standards. Strutton v. Meade, No. 4:05CV02022 ERW, 2008 WL 4534015
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2008); Palermo v. White, No. 08-cv-126-JL, 2008 WL 4224301
(D.N.H. Sept. 5, 2008).
217 328 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (S.D. Iowa 2004).
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court’s application of Turner in Thompson is less deferential than
most. The U.S. District Court in Iowa applied Turner to a civilly
committed sex offender’s motion for summary judgment regard-
ing a proposed settlement agreement requiring him to pay for ko-
sher meals.218 After he sued the state for refusing to provide him
kosher meals, the parties reached a settlement: the Iowa Depart-
ment of Human Services agreed to provide him with Kosher meals,
but only if Thompson paid part of the cost of the meals from his
earnings while civilly committed, an arrangement that he con-
tended was unconstitutional.219
The court in Thompson cited Beerheide v. Suthers,220 a Tenth Cir-
cuit case that held that requiring Jewish prisoners to partially pay
for Kosher meals violated the Free Exercise Clause.221 The Thomp-
son court’s reasoning closely paralleled that in Beerheide: after estab-
lishing that the plaintiff’s beliefs were sincerely held, both courts
found that two asserted penological interests—conserving prison
resources and preventing inmate conflict—were legitimate,222 but
that the state provided insufficient evidence to show that the chal-
lenged policies furthered those legitimate penological goals.223
The court in Thompson additionally found that a third asserted gov-
ernmental interest—“rehabilitation of the patient by teaching fi-
nancial responsibility”—failed to even satisfy the first prong of the
Turner standard: the requirement that Thompson, unlike others,
must pay for his meal punished him “solely on the basis of his
faith.”224
The court in Beerheide cited Turner for the proposition that
prison officials “must still make their case by presenting evidence,
however minimal that evidence might be.”225 While this approach
puts more of a burden on the state than the usual application of
218 Id.
219 Id. at 976.
220 Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2002).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 1187; Thompson, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
223 Beerheide, 286 F.3d at 1191–92 (upholding the district court’s finding that the
state failed to present sufficient evidence that the cost impact of providing kosher
meals would be more than de minimis and that providing kosher meals free of charge
would negatively affect prison guards and other prisoners); Thompson, 328 F. Supp. 2d
at 978 (noting that the state fails to provide budgetary figures to demonstrate a finan-
cial impact or that requiring co-payments would reduce tensions between kosher and
non-kosher “inmates”).
224 Thompson, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
225 Beerheide, 286 F.3d at 1191.
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the Turner test,226 the analyses for prisoners in Beerheide and civilly
committed sex offenders in Thompson are virtually identical. The
Thompson court did not mention whether civil commitment might
differ from prison, or whether penological interests might be dif-
ferent from those of administering a civil commitment center.
Even when the state asserted it had a legitimate interest in rehabili-
tation, the court failed to take the Hendricks purpose-is-treatment-
not-punishment bait, dismissing that interest in relation to the re-
quired payment for kosher food, and continuing to apply the
prison standard from Beerheide.227
A recent district court decision in New York similarly applied
the Turner test to a civilly committed sex offender’s claim that his
free exercise of religion was infringed by a state psychiatric hospi-
tal’s failure to provide him halal meals and refusal to let him
pray.228 In Abdul–Matiyn v. Pataki, the court denied a motion to
dismiss filed by staff and administrators of a state psychiatric hospi-
tal First Amendment claims brought by a convicted sex offender
who had been civilly committed there.229 The court cited a case
that held, “[t]he Free Exercise clause extends ‘into other aspects of
prison life including, pertinently, that of an inmate’s diet . . . ,’ ”230
implicitly assuming that the status of the plaintiff was the same as
that of a prisoner.  In fact, Abdul–Matiyn was a sex offender who,
after his release from prison, had been arrested and detained in
jail due to a parole violation, then transferred to a psychiatric facil-
ity and civilly committed past the time he was scheduled for re-
lease.231 The court applied the Turner test, as articulated by a
Second Circuit prison case.232 In that case, the court ruled in favor
of the plaintiff, denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss because
they had failed to assert any legitimate penological interest to jus-
tify denying the plaintiff halal meals, religious texts, and prayer
226 Perhaps this application of Turner is less deferential because Congress demon-
strated its intent to provide extra protections for the free exercise of religion.
227 Thompson, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
228 Abdul–Matiyn v. Pataki, No. 9:06-CV-1503 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2008).
229 Id.
230 Id. at *12 (citing Johnson v. Guiffere, No. 9:04-CV-57, 2007 WL 3046703, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2007)).
231 Id. at *2–3.
232 Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that Rastafari-
ans’ religious practice of leaving hair unshorn can be reasonably accommodated by
pulling their hair back rather than enforcing a haircut policy but that prison officials
have legitimate penological interests for prohibiting prayer groups that are un-
supervised by non-prisoner religious leaders and for prohibiting the wearing of
crowns).
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time.233 While an application of Turner that renders a decision in
favor of a plaintiff appears unusual, the decision in Abdul–Matiyn
did not reach the merits, as it denied the motion to dismiss a pro se
litigant’s claim. The court’s assumption that the Turner test applied
remains troubling.234
Another decision on a civilly committed sex offender’s free ex-
ercise claim, Bilal v. Lehman, applies RLUIPA after holding that the
Turner standard has been supplanted by the federal statute.235 Yet
the Bilal decision is similar to Thompson and Abdul–Matiyn in that it
treats a free exercise claim under civil commitment much like a
prisoner’s free exercise claim. Applying RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny,
the court found that denying the plaintiff a halal meat diet substan-
tially burdened his sincerely held religious beliefs, failed to further
a compelling governmental interest, and was not the least restric-
tive means of furthering any compelling governmental interest.236
Bilal, a civilly committed Muslim sex offender in Washington State,
sued both Department of Corrections (DOC) officials and officials
of the sex offender civil commitment unit for violating the First
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and RLUIPA.237 While
incarcerated, the defendant had repeatedly requested halal
meat,238 but was given only vegetarian meals, except during relig-
ious holidays.239 After he was civilly confined, he again requested
halal meat, but was given kosher meat until he obtained counsel
233 Abdul–Matiyn, 2008 WL 974409, at *12.
234 Another recent decision applying the Turner test to a civilly committed sex of-
fender’s claim found that a facility’s ban on the practice of martial arts was reasonably
related to institutional security. Marsh v. Liberty Behav. Health Care, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-
125-FtM-34SPC, 2008 WL 821623 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2008). In Marsh, the plaintiff
argued that karate was an integral aspect of his Zen Buddhist religious practice, but
the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, pointing to factual evi-
dence of the security threat posed by martial arts practice. Id. at *3. The plaintiff had
used karate to seriously injure another resident, and that the plaintiff was not prohib-
ited from practicing martial arts in his cell. Id. at *4. The court began its analysis by
noting that civilly committed persons are “due a higher standard of care than those
who are criminally committed” but nevertheless finding that the Turner test applied
because sexually violent predators are in an analogous position to persons who are
criminally confined. Id. at *5.
235 Bilal v. Lehman, No. C04-2507-JLR-JPD, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 93152, at *38
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 2, 2006) (citing Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir.
2005)).
236 Id. at *42.
237 Id. at *1–2. The equal protection claim was based on the fact that prison in-
mates who were Jewish were given kosher meat, but Muslim inmates were not given
halal meat. Id.
238 Id. at *3.
239 Id. at *26
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and filed a complaint.240 At that point, the facility provided him
halal meat but maintained that it was not obligated to do so.241 The
plaintiff sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief against
both the prison where he had been incarcerated and the facility
where he continued to be civilly committed.242
The court assumed that RLUIPA applied to civil commitment,
analyzing the applicability of RLUIPA to the plaintiff’s claim only
on the issue of whether facilities that did not receive federal funds
were subject to RLUIPA.243 The court approached the claims
against the prison and the civil commitment facility differently only
to the extent that, because the plaintiff was no longer in prison, his
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against prison officials
were moot.244 The court then analyzed the plaintiff’s claim against
civil commitment center officials under RLUIPA.245 With Bilal’s
“sincerely held religious belief” undisputed, the court found that
his religious practices were substantially burdened.246 Citing the
Cutter decision on the same issue, the court reasoned that evidence
showed that eating halal meat is a regular practice of many Mus-
lims,247 and the state had failed to demonstrate compelling reasons
to deny the plaintiff halal meat or that such denial is the least re-
strictive means to achieve its purposes.248 The court then found
that the state failed to show that the challenged policy furthered
the asserted governmental interests of reducing costs,249 streamlin-
ing food production,250 or limiting security risks.251 The court re-
jected the defendants’ assertion that the Turner standard should be
applied to determine whether the policy is the least restrictive
means of achieving government goals: “When Congress passed
RLUIPA, it replaced the Turner rational basis standard of review
with a strict scrutiny standard.”252 The state clearly failed that
test.253
Infringements on civilly committed sex offenders’ speech are
240 Id. at *6.
241 Bilal, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93152, at *6.
242 Id. at *2.
243 Id. at *8.
244 Id. at *48.
245 Id. at *5–6.
246 Id. at *19, *26–27.
247 Bilal, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93152, at *26–27; Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714.
248 Bilal, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93152, at *57.
249 Id. at *31 (citing Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471, 480 (D. Ariz. 1995)).
250 Id. at *35.
251 Id. at *37.
252 Id. at *38.
253 Id. at *42.
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highly likely to be upheld with the extremely deferential Turner
test, but infringements on free exercise of religion are likely to be
found unconstitutional under RLUIPA (and a less deferential ver-
sion of Turner that perhaps stems from the courts’ knowledge that
Congress has legislated on the issue.). Prisoners’ and civilly com-
mitted sex offenders’ First Amendment claims thus fare the same
in federal court because the same tests are applied to both catego-
ries of plaintiffs. Either the status of prisoners and civilly commit-
ted sex offenders is the same (implicating double jeopardy, ex post
facto, and procedural due process violations with regard to civil
commitment), or courts should apply a different standard recog-
nizing civilly committed sex offenders’ civil status.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRISON STANDARD
Given the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Hendricks
that civil commitment is not imprisonment,254 the prison standard
is not appropriate for civilly committed sex offenders’ First Amend-
ment claims.  It is worth asking what the appropriate standard
would be, but before doing so, some fundamental issues require
attention.
A core problem with civil commitment is the underlying con-
stitutional infirmity of civilly committing sex offenders when treat-
ment—the characteristic that allegedly distinguishes civil
commitment from imprisonment—has not been proven to reduce
recidivism and is often a legislative justification rather than a genu-
ine goal.255 Even beyond the question of the efficacy of treatment,
much of the science underlying civil commitment is suspect.
Michael Perlin has argued that the Hendricks decision, like much
mental disability jurisprudence, is characterized by what he terms
“pretextuality”: “courts accept, either implicitly or explicitly, testi-
monial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest decisionmak-
ing.”256 Other scholars have noted that the use of dubious scientific
claims to justify civil commitment constitutes another variation of
pretextuality, one that “provides a legitimizing cover, allowing the
state to cast the constitutionally doubtful preventive detention of
dangerous individuals as constitutionally safe civil commitment.”257
The Hendricks decision hinges on treatment—because the stat-
ute’s purpose was treatment and not punishment, the Court found
254 See supra notes 41–61 and accompanying text.
255 See supra note 18.
256 Perlin, supra note 42, at 1252.
257 Prentky, Science on Trial, supra note 58, at 361.
2009] RIGHTS OF CIVILLY COMMITTED SEX OFFENDERS 321
that it passed constitutional muster. But treatment was merely a
pretext for the Kansas civil commitment statute. The Court ig-
nored facts that showed that treatment was not the bona fide goal
of Kansas’s confinement of Hendricks,258 and failed to consider
compelling evidence that the treatment of sex offenders was en-
tirely unproven.259 Twelve years after Hendricks, the efficacy of sex
offender treatment is still far from widely accepted.260 Although
courts are reluctant to become involved in “battles of the experts”
over whether treatment works, given the high constitutional values
at stake, the judiciary cannot afford to ignore the contested state of
scientific research on the treatment of sex offenders in civil com-
mitment.261 The law has developed tools to evaluate the acceptabil-
ity of scientific evidence,262 and courts must be cautious about
premising decisions on unproven science.
Scholars have argued that science plays an especially impor-
tant role in civil commitment proceedings, in which scientific testi-
mony on diagnoses and future risk of harmful behavior are
determinative of indefinite confinement.263 The question of what is
258 The State of Kansas failed to afford Hendricks any treatment during his civil
commitment until the eve of litigation. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 383–84
(1997). See supra note 69.
259 Two amicus briefs made this point: Brief for the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion as Amicus Curiae in Support of Leroy Hendricks at 29–30, Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346 (1997) (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075), 1996 WL 469200 (citing U.S. GEN. AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT: RESEARCH RESULTS INCONCLUSIVE ABOUT
WHAT WORKS TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM GAO/GDD-96-137 (1996) (arguing that a parens
patriae state power does not justify civil confinement where “available treatments are
far from proven”) and Brief for the National Mental Health Association as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 14, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
(No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 471077 (pointing to research findings that “little, if any, ef-
fective treatment for violent sex offenders” exists). Both briefs point out that, unlike
sex offender treatment, treatment of mental illness is widely accepted and demonstra-
bly effective. See Brief of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11–12, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
(No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 471027.
260 See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Monica Davey & Abby Good-
nough, For Sex Offenders, Dispute on Therapy’s Benefit, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at A1
(noting the lack of research on effective treatment as well as a dearth of ethical and
training standards for psychologists conducting assessments). Janus points to research
that suggests that highly supervised community living can effectively reduce the risk of
recidivism. See JANUS, supra note 7, at 121–22.
261 One barrier to evaluating the efficacy of treatment in the context of civil con-
finement is that so few civilly confined offenders are released, resulting in a dearth of
data on recidivism rates after their release.
262 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (announc-
ing a multi-factor test to determine whether novel scientific evidence should be
admitted).
263 Prentky, Science on Trial, supra note 59, at 357.
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“good science” plagues courtrooms and has been the subject of
much scholarship.264 Some have argued that critics of “junk sci-
ence” in courtrooms carry their own political agendas.265 It is clear,
nevertheless, that in the scientific community, the meaning and va-
lidity of diagnoses assigned to sex offenders,266 the reliability of ac-
tuarial assessments of future dangerousness,267 and the efficacy of
264 See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGES: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURT-
ROOM (1991). “Good science” has been defined as “the faithful and rigorous adher-
ence to the findings, the limitations, and the conclusions of published, peer-reviewed
articles in scientific journals.” Prentky, Science on Trial, supra note 59, at 358.
265 See, e.g., Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing “Junk Science,” 1998 STANFORD
TECH. L. REV. 3 (1998) (arguing that the junk-science model is a politically charged
framework used to advance a conservative tort-reform agenda).
266 See Andrew Hammel, The Importance of Being Insane: Sexual Predator Civil Commit-
ment Laws and the Idea of Sex Crimes as Insane Acts, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 775, 808–09 (1995)
(noting that the most common diagnosis applied to sex offenders, antisocial personal-
ity disorder, probably applies to the majority of incarcerated criminal offenders gen-
erally); see also Prentky, Science on Trial, supra note 59, at 368 (citing John Kip
Cornwell, Understanding the Role of the Police and Parens Patriae Powers in Involuntary Civil
Commitment Before and After Hendricks, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y AND L. 377 (1998)) (any-
where between 50% and 75% of the prison population might qualify for civil commit-
ment on the basis of an [Antisocial Personality Disorder] diagnosis,” raising a
constitutional problem because the Supreme Court has held that “SVP commitments
must target a small subgroup that is somehow distinguished from the ordinary dan-
gerous recidivist.”). Prentky also notes that, because the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders used by psychiatrists provides little guidance on diagnosing
rapists, many are diagnosed with Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified, a diagnosis
whose definition is “so amorphous that no research has ever been conducted to estab-
lish its validity.” Id. at 366 (citing Holly A. Miller et al., Sexually Violent Predator Evalua-
tions: Empirical Evidence, Strategies for Professionals, and Research Directions, 29 LAW &
HUMAN BEHAV. 29, 39 (2005)).
267 Actuarial risk assessment is a statistical method of assessing the risk of recidivism
that identifies and assigns importance to various risk factors, creating a formula to
calculate the risk for an individual offender. JANUS, supra note 7, at 56–58. While
many researchers allow that actuarial assessments are more accurate than clinical as-
sessment (wherein an individual clinician estimates future risk of reoffending based
on interviewing an offender), whether these new techniques merit admissibility is an
open question. See, e.g., Terence W. Campbell, Sexual Predator Evaluations and Phrenol-
ogy: Considering Issues of Evidentiary Reliability, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 111 (2000); Thomas
R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 409 (2001); see also Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk
Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1443, 1444  (2003) (arguing that “actuarial methods have proven equal or supe-
rior to clinical judgments,” though some scales are more reliable than others). Even
so, “the morality of depriving people of long-term liberty based on predictions of
future crimes is questionable, in significant part because all prediction is ultimately
based on group membership.” Id. at 1478. The Department of Justice noted that actu-
arial risk assessment, while more accurate than clinical judgment, “cannot determine
whether a particular person will or will not reoffend.” CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSESSMENT IN SEX OFFENDER MANAGE-
MENT: AN OVERVIEW OF KEY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 6 (2007), available at http://
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treatment268 are deeply contested. While diagnosis and predictions
of future dangerousness are the elements that determine whether
a sex offender will face indeterminate detention, the efficacy of
treatment is the linchpin to the constitutionality of the civil com-
mitment enterprise.269
If one accepts for a moment the premise that civil commit-
ment is not punitive and is on that basis distinguishable from im-
prisonment, the question becomes what standard should apply to
civilly committed sex offenders’ First Amendment claims. An appli-
cation of the Turner test with civil-confinement-related interests
simply substituted for penological interests is inappropriate be-
cause Turner drew on a long line of prison cases.270 The great def-
erence to prison administrators’ goals stems from the well-
established primacy of prison security as a penological goal.271 Be-
cause Hendricks held that the purpose of sex offender civil confine-
ment is not punitive,272 courts would need to look to First
Amendment free speech cases outside of the incarceration context
to develop a standard for analyzing the rights of civilly committed
sex offenders.273 One potential model is the treatment of students’
First Amendment rights at school.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, the Supreme
Court declared that neither students nor teachers “shed their con-
stitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
www.csom.org/pubs/assessment_brief.pdf. It also noted that the tool can produce
both false-positive and false-negative results. Id.
268 JANUS, supra note 7, at 53–54. “There is no consensus about the efficacy of sex
offender treatment.” Id. Janus notes that some experts believe intensive supervision in
the community is the best strategy to prevent recidivism. Id. at 121 (citing ROBERT
ALAN PRENTKY & ANN WOLBERT BURGESS, FORENSIC MANAGEMENT OF SEXUAL OFFEND-
ERS 243 (2000)).
269 A recent case points out deeply troubling methods of predicting of future dan-
gerousness. In In re M.D., the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a
civilly committed sex offender’s petition for discharge after ten years in civil confine-
ment. 757 N.W.2d 559 (N.D. 2008). One expert testified, based on actuarial assess-
ments, that M.D. was unlikely to reoffend. Id. at 560. The other expert found that his
treatment had thus far been ineffective, largely on the basis of the petitioner’s consen-
sual sexual relationship with another civilly committed man who was described as
“young-looking.” Id. The dissent pointed out that the court’s decision would indefi-
nitely confine a person based on a homosexual relationship for which the petitioner
could not be sanctioned criminally, and that if after ten years, the petitioner had not
completed treatment, the efficacy of such treatment was questionable. Id. at 563–64
(Kapsner, J., dissenting) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
270 See supra notes 82–88 and accompanying text.
271 Id.
272 See supra Section III.
273 Because the civil commitment of sex offenders falls within RLUIPA’s applica-
tion to institutions, that statute provides the standard for free exercise claims.
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house gate.”274 The Court held that freedom of speech may be
restricted by school administrators only with a showing that such
expression “materially and substantially” interferes with appropri-
ate discipline.275 Tinker acknowledges that students’ First Amend-
ment rights are affected by the “special characteristics of the school
environment,” noting that schools educate “the young for citizen-
ship” but that school officials have the “comprehensive author-
ity. . .to prescribe and control conduct in the schools,” albeit in a
manner “consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards.276
The Tinker rule has been modified by subsequent decisions hold-
ing that school officials can restrict vulgar and lewd student
speech,277 school-sponsored student speech,278 and student speech
that promotes (or can be reasonably interpreted as promoting)
drug use,279 regardless of whether such speech has caused a disrup-
tion. A standard that similarly acknowledges the right of civilly
committed sex offenders to speak freely unless such expression ma-
terially and substantially interferes with the administration of civil
commitment centers would put a higher burden on administrators
to justify restrictions than the extremely deferential Turner test.
Clearly the functions and characteristics of civil commitment
facilities are entirely different from those of schools. A First
Amendment rule based on Tinker must take into account the spe-
cial characteristics of civil commitment facilities, including security
concerns and their underlying purposes of providing treatment
and incapacitating sex offenders. With these characteristics and
purposes in mind, courts might conduct a fact-specific inquiry to
determine whether the speech a commitment facility seeks to limit
would substantially and materially interfere with the center’s ad-
ministration. In Tinker, the Court noted that the donning of black
armbands to protest the Vietnam War by high school students was
a “silent, passive expression of opinion”280 and that there was “no
evidence whatever of petitioners’ interference, actual or nascent,
with the schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other stu-
dents to be secure and to be let alone.”281 The Court also found
274 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). See infra Part
V.B.
275 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th
Cir.1966)).
276 Id. at 506, 507.
277 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
278 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
279 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
280 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
281 Id.
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that there was no evidence that the actions resulted in violence or
threats of violence or the disruption of classes.282 In the sex of-
fender commitment facility context, the Court in Rivera might have
looked to whether the sexually explicit letter from the plaintiff’s
girlfriend threatened to disrupt the administration of the center.283
The letter was presumably mailed from one consenting adult to
another. While the court noted that sexually explicit materials
might interfere with treatment goals, a fact-specific inquiry would
determine whether the letter undermined the plaintiff’s treatment.
Such an inquiry would likely raise difficult questions, reminiscent
of Youngberg: should a facility’s assertion that such a letter was con-
trary to treatment goals be accepted at face value? In Tinker, the
Court questioned the school’s assertion that the wearing of arm-
bands was inherently disruptive, a reminder that the judiciary has
not always deferred so completely to institutional administrators. A
court is more likely to follow the considerable deference to hospi-
tal administrators in Youngberg, however, as the civil commitment of
people with mental illnesses is more analogous to sex offender civil
commitment than is a public secondary school, characterized by
the Court in Tinker as “a marketplace of ideas.”284
Even if courts gave more deference to civil commitment ad-
ministrators than to the school administrators in Tinker, once the
extreme deference of Turner is removed, a global policy that bans
all sexually explicit materials would become suspect. Where the
goal is treatment, not punishment, a strong argument can be made
that policies in treatment centers should be individualized, since
sex offenders are a heterogeneous group.285 In prisons, by contrast,
policies address universal institutional needs, such as security. Indi-
vidual facts might still support interference with mail in a civil com-
mitment facility. If the facts showed that a civilly committed sex
offender was sexually coercing others at the commitment center,
and such behavior was linked to his possession of sexually explicit
materials, a court might find that the restriction on speech was jus-
tified because of material and substantial interference with the ad-
282 Id.
283 Rivera v. Rogers, No. 02-CV-2798 (DMC), 2006 WL 1455789 (D.N.J. May 22,
2006). See notes 137–56 and accompanying text.
284 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
285 CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., supra note 272, at 1 (stating that comprehensive
assessments are needed to determine how best to manage individual sex offenders
because they are a “heterogeneous group” with differences in “the types of victims
they target, their reasons for engaging in such behavior, the degree to which they are
motivated to change, the types of interventions that will be most effective for them,
and their risk of reoffending.”).
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ministration of the center.286
Applying this test to the facts in Fogle,287 a court would inquire
whether the “read order” for the plaintiff’s mail was justified be-
cause unscrutinized mail materially and substantially interfered
with the administration of the Missouri Sexual Offender Treat-
ment Center. While the Center might argue that by breaking the
phone card rules, the plaintiff had substantially interfered with
rules of the Center and, therefore, with its orderly administration,
the court might ask how reading the content of the plaintiff’s mail
related to such interference. The court’s account of the facts of the
case does not indicate how the content of the letters relates to the
receipt of phone cards.
The risk to modeling an analysis of the First Amendment
rights of civilly committed sex offenders on Tinker and the subse-
quent school cases is that the exceptions could swallow the rule, as
civil commitment facility administrators are likely to argue the
same interests advanced by prison officials: security, safety, and the
need to create incentives for good behavior. If these interests re-
semble penological interests, it is because they are such interests.
Even a new standard might slide into the prison standard because,
as the federal courts have implicitly recognized, sex offender civil
commitment is penological in nature. Attempts to find a more ap-
propriate First Amendment standard inevitably lead back to the
prison cases, revealing the pretextuality of the Hendricks holding
that civil commitment is not punitive and is thereby constitutional.
The constitutional implications of confining individuals with-
out clear criteria for future dangerousness or mental impairment
and without the due process protections of the criminal justice sys-
tem have been much discussed. The First Amendment infringe-
ments that accompany civil commitment also deserve serious
attention. With the First Amendment’s exalted place in the Ameri-
can constitutional scheme,288 the Supreme Court has warned that
286 These hypothetical facts are based on a recent case involving First Amendment
claims by an incarcerated sex offender. See Thomas v. Werholtz, 272 F. App’x 687
(10th Cir. 2008). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the
confiscation of twelve sexually explicit letters by prison officials did not violate the
plaintiff’s First Amendment rights because, while he had a right to receive the mail,
“the continuing right to retain the mail lies in state law, not constitutional law.”
Thomas v. Werholtz, No. 04-3237-CM, 2006 WL 2726271, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 20,
2006). The Tenth Circuit also noted that other inmates had complained that the
plaintiff tried to intimidate them into having sex with them; prison personnel asserted
that the letters corroborated these complaints. Id.
287 See supra notes 175–86 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
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any such restriction is only justified by “clear and present dan-
ger.”289 The future danger to public safety posed by any individual
sex offender is speculative, but the danger to such an offender’s
First Amendment rights, by contrast, is manifest. First Amendment
rights are being abridged by the application of the prison standard
to persons with civil status—clearly, presently, and dangerously.
VII. CONCLUSION
The state cannot have it both ways.  If confinement of a sexually
violent predator is civil for the purposes of evaluation under the
Ex Post Facto Clause, that confinement is civil for the purposes
of determining the rights to which the detainee is entitled while
confined. Civil status means civil status, with all the . . . rights
that accompany it.290
Presently, civilly committed sex offenders lack the protections
of the criminal justice system, but endure all of the restrictions of
imprisonment. They are in an untenable legal limbo. When the
Ninth Circuit addressed a challenge to the conditions of confine-
ment by a sex offender awaiting a commitment hearing, the court
held that if conditions prior to confinement are worse than condi-
tions in confinement, the challenged conditions are presumed to
be unconstitutionally punitive, “[o]r to put it more colorfully, pur-
gatory cannot be worse than hell.”291 While the Ninth Circuit was
referring to a detainee’s substantive due process claim prior to civil
commitment, the same principle holds for the First Amendment
rights of civilly committed sex offenders. With their double jeop-
ardy and ex post facto claims denied, but their First Amendment
claims treated like those of prisoners, civilly committed sex offend-
ers are in a kind of purgatory. Their constitutional rights are cur-
tailed under the deferential Turner standard as though they were
prisoners, but they lack the procedural protections the Constitu-
tion affords prisoners. The state is indeed having it both ways.
289 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
290 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing summary judgment
in a civil detainee’s claim of substantive due process violations). While awaiting a civil
commitment determination the detainee was subjected to more restrictive conditions
than prison inmates in the same facility: he was denied access to religious services; his
access to the prison library was curtailed; and his recreational activities were elimi-
nated. Id. at 924.
291 Id. at 933; see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (holding that pretrial detain-
ees cannot be punished because they have not yet been convicted).

